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Disclosure of Material Environmental Information in the 
Hard Rock Mining Industry 
Robert Repetto 
Abstract 
The requirements applicable to hard rock mining companies listed on U.S. or Canadian
stock exchanges for financial disclosure of material environmental information are
summarized. Ten financially material environmental events that occurred to ten such
mining companies in recent years are reviewed to explore to what extent the companies
had complied with such requirements. These events included dam failures, increases in
remediation liabilities, increased bonding requirements, and other environmentally-
related changes. The most common shortcomings in disclosure were found in the failure
of the Management Discussion & Analysis section of company financial reports to
disclose material risks and uncertainties known to management which were likely to
result in material changes in financial conditions and results. 
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Disclosure of Material Environmental Information in the 
Hard Rock Mining Industry 
Robert Repetto 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Full disclosure of material information1 by publicly owned companies is obviously 
crucial for the efficient functioning of capital markets and for the protection of 
investors, as recent corporate scandals have underscored. Full disclosure has therefore 
long been the foundation of U.S. and Canadian securities law and regulation. It has 
also long been recognized that some environmental information is material and must 
be disclosed. Disclosure, can forestall attempts by corporate managers to boost short-
term profitability by measures that are not in the long-term interests of shareholders, 
including efforts to conceal environmental liabilities or to pursue risky environ­
mental policies. There are increasing demands from shareholders, including large 
institutional investors, for fuller disclosure of environmental information. Securities 
regulators, environmental protection agencies and other government bodies have also 
expressed concern about the inadequacy of such disclosures. 
In the securities laws of both the United States and Canada, the fundamental rule 
is that all material information must be promptly disclosed. In both countries, 
existing law requires disclosure in the Management Discussion & Analysis sections of 
financial reports of risks and uncertainties known to management that would be 
reasonably likely to cause future financial results and conditions to differ materially 
from those currently reported. In addition, there are specific requirements for the 
disclosure of material environmental information, including the current and future 
financial impacts of environmental regulations and environmental risk factors that 
might have a material effect on the enterprise. Environmental liabilities, such as the 
1 Information is material, 
according to Canadian and 
U.S. law, if reasonable 
investors would find it rele­
vant to their investment deci­
sions. 
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2 Material events included 
those involving bankruptcies; 
abrupt and large percentage 
movements in the company’s 
stock price; denials in 
operating permits to exploit 
important properties; or 
increases in financial 
liabilities and obligations 
that were significant in the 
context of the company’s 
overall balance sheet. The 
financial magnitude of the 
events selected for 
investigation left little doubt 
of their materiality. 
future costs of closure and reclamation of mining sites, must be disclosed unless the 
firm can make a determination that such expenditures are not reasonably likely to be 
necessary, or, if necessary, not financially material. In disclosing such liabilities, firms 
must reveal a probable range of costs even if no single figure can be determined. 
These environmental disclosure rules are particularly applicable to hard rock 
mining companies because their operations typically have significant environmental 
impacts and require extensive reclamation when concluded. In the past, mining 
companies have understated environmental risks and liabilities, such as closure and 
reclamation costs, and have declared bankruptcy when mining has ceased, leaving 
costly environmental clean-up operations to the public sector. 
The study reported here investigated the adequacy of Canadian and U.S. mining 
companies’ disclosures of material environmental information. The methodology of 
the study consisted of the following steps: 
First, a number of recent events were identified that 1) occurred to publicly-traded 
mining companies listed on U.S. or Canadian stock markets; 2) had material2 
financial significance for those companies and their investors or creditors; 3) were 
related to the companies’ environmental exposures, performances, obligations, or 
liabilities. 
Second, the financial filings and press releases of the company involved in each 
event before, after, and at the time of the event were examined to learn what the com­
pany had disclosed about each of the events. For U.S. companies, this involved 
reviewing 10-K, 10-Q and 8-K forms. For Canadian companies, it involved reviewing 
annual information forms, press releases and other periodic and special disclosures. 
Third, the background and context of each event was investigated to learn what the 
company involved knew or was in a position to know about the event when and after 
it happened and what it was in a position to know about the possibility or likelihood 
of the event before it occurred. This phase was carried out by examining reports, stud­
ies and other material prepared by government agencies, consultants or other experts 
that would have been available to the company and other parties at specific times. 
Summaries of the case studies carried out with this methodology are given below. 
In all but one of the case studies, disclosures were found to be deficient, especially 
in the disclosure to investors of known material environmental risks and liabilities. 
This finding lends weight to recent calls for stricter enforcement by securities regula­
tors of existing environmental disclosure requirements and for better compliance by 
publicly listed companies with current environmental disclosure rules. 
Canyon Resources, Inc. – The Kendall Mine, Montana, USA 
The Kendall gold mine in Lewiston, Montana, is owned and operated by Canyon 
Resources, Inc. The company’s $1.86 million reclamation performance bond had 
existed since 1989. In October 1999, the Montana Department of Environmental 
Quality, after reviewing the costs of cleaning up the cyanide leach pad and other mine 
works, increased the required bond to $8.3 million. This increase was a material amount 
for the company relative to its total and current assets of $81.8 and $13.6 million at the 
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end of 1998. On August 21, 2000, the DEQ raised the bond amount to $14.2 million. 
Prior to October 1999, Canyon Resources knew that its reclamation bond was under 
review by the Montana DEQ, so the possibility that the required bond might be raised 
by a material amount was an uncertainty known to management prior to the event 
and had to be disclosed under Item 303(d). 
The company did disclose this material uncertainty in its 1998 10-K filing on April 
7, 1999. The report’s MD&A stated, “The DEQ requires the Company to maintain a 
$1,869,000 Reclamation Bond to ensure appropriate reclamation. The DEQ is cur­
rently reviewing the adequacy of the bond amount and the Company anticipates that 
the DEQ will require a bond increase, but cannot presently predict the amount of any 
such increase.” 
Moreover, in the company’s third quarter 10-Q filing, dated September 30, 1999, it 
promptly disclosed the increased bond amount. Next year, in its quarterly 10-Q filing 
for September 30, 2000, the company stated, “In August, 2000, the DEQ further 
revised the bond amount to approximately $14.2 million. The company believes the 
DEQ bond amount exceeds the cost of remaining work and has filed an 
administrative appeal to the DEQ’s actions.”3 In subsequent disclosures through the 
third quarter of 2003, the company discussed its ongoing controversy with the DEQ 
over reclamation at the Kendall mine, including information that in February 2002 
the DEQ had decided that a comprehensive Environmental Impact Statement would 
be required to guide the remaining reclamation, which the company said would 
needlessly delay work and increase costs. 
In conclusion, Canyon Resources did promptly disclose material information, as 
required, and provided the required warning regarding a material uncertainty known 
to management. 
Hecla Mining Company – Coeur d’Alene Basin, Idaho, USA 
A century’s mining and smelting by many companies in Idaho’s Coeur d’Alene basin 
resulted in such extensive metals pollution that a 21 square mile area was made one 
of the nation’s first Superfund sites in 1983. In February 1998, EPA started to study 
whether a much bigger area should be included in the site, which a federal court 
affirmed in June 2000. EPA’s draft Remediation Investigation/Feasibility Study, 
describing clean-up options in the larger area with costs ranging from $194 to $2,600 
million, was released for comment in June 2000 and finalized in July 2001. In 
September 2001 EPA’s Record of Decision chose an option with a present value cost 
of $360 million, excluding the costs of cleaning up the original smaller site. 
Meanwhile, in March 1996, the U.S. Department of Justice sued the company for 
recovery of clean-up costs and natural resource damages over the entire basin. In 
September 2003, the trial’s first phase was decided, assigning Hecla a 31 percent 
liability for whatever damages were subsequently determined. 
Although Hecla disclosed material events related to the Coeur d’Alene/Bunker Hill 
Superfund site as they occurred and warned investors that these events may have 
material adverse effects on the company, disclosure fell short on three counts. 
3	 Canyon Resources, Inc., 10-Q 
report, Third Quarter, 
September 20, 2000, notes 
to CFS, Commitments and 
Contingencies, (a) Site 
Restoration Costs, p.11. 
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4	 Mining Watch Canada and 
The Sierra Club of Canada. 
“TOXICanada: Thirteen Good 
Reasons to Establish a Clean 
Canada Fund” [online]. July 1, 
2001. Available: 
http://www.miningwatch.ca 
/publications/toxic_13.html. 
11-23-03. 
First, after the court assigned a 31 percent liability to Hecla, the EPA’s Record of 
Decision with respect to clean-up costs in the wider basin (Operating Unit 3), and the 
estimated costs of cleaning up the Bunker Hill “Box” (Operating Units 1 and 2), it was 
implausible that the potential liability of $18 million that the company disclosed was 
as likely as any other figure or that the range of $18 to $58 million captured the com­
pany’s potential liability, for the following reasons: 
●	 Within Operating Units 1 and 2, the total clean-up expenditures were esti­
mated in a GAO study at about $212 million, most of which was borne by 
state and federal agencies and is included in the amounts the government 
seeks to recover in part from Hecla based on its 31 percent liability. 
●	 The EPA’s Record of Decision estimated a $359 million discounted present 
cost for the preferred remediation option for Unit 3, of which 31 percent is 
$111 million. 
●	 Although the trial judge opined that the plaintiffs had exaggerated natural 
resource damages, the alleged damages exceeded a billion dollars, based on 
contamination in a 1,500 square mile area over a period extending decades 
into the past and decades into the future. It is questionable that the most 
likely trial outcome is that damages will be found to be negligible. 
Second, current regulations require a company to  disclose the assumptions under­
lying its liability estimates. Hecla has not done this with respect to the liability it has 
accrued for the Coeur d’Alene site. 
Third, from the time the government sued the company for damages and cost 
recovery in 1996 to the time of the court’s assignment of substantial liability to Hecla 
in 2003, events indicated the company’s increasing financial exposure to the basin’s 
problems. These events included a court’s affirmation that the wider basin could be 
included in the CERCLA action, the release of the EPA’s draft RI/FS report with its 
range of costs, the Record of Decision indicating a discounted present cost of $360 
million for the preferred option, and finally the decision of the first phase of the trial 
assigning Hecla 31 percent liability. As seen through the eyes of management, this 
increasing financial risk to the company must have been obvious, given the efforts it 
made through negotiation, legal and political channels to limit the company’s expo­
sure. Nonetheless, the Management Discussion & Analysis sections of financial 
reports over this period provide little such guidance beyond an indication that unfa­
vorable outcomes could have material adverse consequences. 
Anvil Range Mining Company – The Faro Mine 
In 1994, Anvil Range Mining Company purchased the Faro zinc and lead mine in the 
Yukon from a receiver for the assets of Curragh Resources, which went bankrupt in 
1992. Anvil operated the mine into 1997 but declared bankruptcy in April of 1998,4 
though in the fall of 1997 the company had declared assets of $162.5 million and lia­
bilities of $93.8 million. However, the present value cost of closing and cleaning up 
the Faro mine had been estimated in 1993 at $124 million, against which Anvil held a 
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Reclamation Securities Trust containing $12.5 million in 1998. In November 1994 
Anvil Range had agreed to fund the Trust from operating revenues with contributions 
varying with the net price of zinc. In October 1995 Anvil Range had also recognized a 
liability of $43.5 million for environmental remediation on the property, having 
adopted Curragh’s assumptions that reprocessing of tailings and lower reclamation 
standards would bring the costs well below those estimated in 1993. 
Under this arrangement, falling zinc prices lowered the company’s contributions 
to the Reclamation Securities Trust at the same time that the reprocessing of tailings 
became less economical, raising the company’s reclamation liabilities. The company 
never made this risk clear as zinc prices fluctuated nor did it disclose a current 
estimate of the environmental liability in the event that reprocessing of tailings 
proved infeasible. By 1998, when the company declared bankruptcy, inflation and the 
increased volume of waste materials had raised the previous estimated cost of $125 
million to the $145-150 million range, more than enough to make the company 
insolvent. 
The company consistently stated in its financial disclosures that it expected the 
amounts accumulating in the RST to be adequate to meet its closure and reclamation 
obligations at Faro. Thus, up to the brink of bankruptcy, Anvil Range continued to 
maintain that it had adequately provided for reclamation of the Faro mine and failed 
to disclose its increasing liability as its strategy for funding the reclamation 
disintegrated. 
Manhattan Minerals Corporation – The Tambogrande Mine, Peru 
Manhattan Minerals Corporation is a Canadian mining company devoted interna­
tionally to the exploration and development of mining properties. Its shares trade on 
the Toronto Stock Exchange. Its principal asset was a concession to develop a gold 
mine in Tambogrande, Peru, acquired in 1997 from President Fujimori by supreme 
decree. There was persistent opposition to the mine in Tambogrande since deposits 
lie under the town itself and mining operations were thought to be a potential threat 
to profitable commercial agricultural production. A company-funded Environmental 
Impact Study and discussions between the company and community organizations 
over several years failed to overcome opposition. On October 11th, 2002, the local gov­
ernment announced that a popular referendum would be held and on June 2, 2002, 
the residents of the town where the mine would be located conducted a referendum 
on the question of whether the mine project should go forward. Over 93 percent of 
those participating voted “No”. 
Manhattan Minerals’ stock price fell by approximately 30 percent in the following 
days. Moreover, in September 2002, the company announced that due to “volatility in 
equity markets,” the company was postponing a private placement and re-pricing 
significantly downwards share purchase warrants that it had issued a year earlier. This 
increased the company’s difficulties in demonstrating to the Peruvian government 
that it had the financing to develop the concession property, a question then at issue. 
In December 2003, this issue formed the announced basis for the government’s 
decision that Manhattan Minerals had not fulfilled the financial requirements of the 
yale school of forestry & environmental studies 
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project and had forfeited its concession rights. Therefore, the referendum was clearly 
a material financial event for the company. 
Throughout 2001 and 2002, the company’s press releases and financial reports dis­
cussed its consultations with the community and progress in carrying out the 
Environmental Impact Assessment. However, the first mention of the referendum 
came in a press release dated February 14, 2002, in which the company declared: 
“On February 10, 2002 the Ministry of Energy and Mines published in the 
official gazette its resolution to enforce existing laws in Peru that prevent local 
municipalities from calling referendums on issues which conflict with 
National laws. Specifically, the Government of Peru has now publicly stated 
their legal findings that a referendum on mining in the District of 
TamboGrande is not legal and that the Government will enforce the existing 
laws against such a referendum through the National Prosecutor if necessary.” 
No indication was given in that release that the popular referendum constituted a 
material risk to the company’s project or plans or a risk to investors. 
The company’s disclosures did not mention the impending resolution again until 
June 2, 2002, the day of the voting, when it issued a press release attacking the 
referendum and re-emphasizing its illegality. Results were not disclosed until the 
following day. 
In summary, the strong local opposition to Manhattan Mineral’s project in 
Tambogrande, culminating in an overwhelmingly negative vote in the community 
referendum in June 2002, was a material risk and a known uncertainty in the months 
leading up to the voting. The overwhelmingly negative vote in that poll resulted in a 
significant loss to shareholders and contributed to the challenge facing the company 
in attracting the capital needed to meet the financial conditions in its concession 
agreement. The company’s disclosures in the months prior to the referendum did not 
disclose this risk adequately to investors. 
Cambior – The Omai Mine, Guyana 
Overnight between August 19 and 20, 1995, the tailings dam failed at Cambior’s Omai 
gold mine in Guyana, releasing approximately 4 million cubic meters of cyanide-
laden mine waste into the Omai river, which feeds into the Essequibo, which 
eventually runs through the capital city of Georgetown. Cambior’s stock plummeted 
23 percent from Friday, August 18, 1995, to Monday, August 21, 1995. Trading volume 
went from about 27,000 on the 18th to about 3.7 million on the 21st. Moreover, the dam 
remained closed for months while the failure was investigated and a new tailings 
impoundment was constructed, resulting in substantial loss of income and additional 
costs for the company. 
At the time of the failure, the amount of fluid in storage was eight times larger than 
the maximum allowable amount specified in the project’s 1991 Environmental Impact 
Statement, which was the only operating plan in existence for the Omai mine project. 
The impoundment’s cyanide content was many times higher than permitted in 
releases to the river. 
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In addition, according to the report5 of the Dam Review Team to the Guyana 
Geology and Mines Committee, appointed to study the dam failure, the failure result­
ed from flaws in the dam’s design and construction. 
“It is our current judgment that failure of the dam was caused by massive 
loss of core integrity resulting from internal erosion of the dam fill, a process 
also known as piping. This means simply that finer particles from one soil 
moved freely under the influence of seepage forces into and through the 
interstitial voids of adjacent coarser soil due to excessive disparity between 
particle sizes of the two soils, allowing cavities and tunnels to develop with­
in the dam.” 
“In basic terms then, the rock fill adjacent to the filter sand was simply too 
coarse to prevent the sand from washing into and through it, and both 
potential and actual problems this produced appear to have gone unrecog­
nized or uncorrected throughout the sequence of design and construction 
until the failure occurred.” 
The Dam Review Committee thus found that the failure was caused primarily by 
faulty design and construction that went unrecognized or uncorrected. Evidence from 
other sources indicates that the problems were not unknown, but remained 
uncorrected. The Commission of Enquiry quoted from faxes between the resident 
engineer supervising the company’s employees constructing the dam and the 
engineering firm’s head office in September 1992, when the first stage of the dam was 
under construction. The resident engineer pointed out that with respect to the grades 
of rock fill adjacent to the filter sand, “It is fairly certain that the selected run of mine 
waste will not satisfy this specification. Is there room for coarsening the specification?” 
The reply came back: “. . . basically we will accept the finest of the run of mine muck 
which should be fairly close to spec (i.e., some coarsening of spec is acceptable.)”6 
The Review Team also found that a corrugated steel diversion conduit through the 
dam had leaked, contributing to the dam’s internal erosion. Again, the Commission 
of Enquiry cited communications between the project engineer and his home office 
during dam construction discussing whether to grout and reinforce the conduit with 
cement. The decision was not to do so, but to accept the risk that the culvert would 
collapse. 
Cambior disclosed the dam failure and subsequent events in a series of press 
releases and financial reports starting in 1995. However, prior to the event, there was 
no mention in any of the company’s Management Discussion & Analysis filings that 
the build-up of liquid behind the dam to volumes many times greater than its design 
capacity, combined with known flaws in the design and construction of the dam, con­
stituted a known material risk or uncertainty. Since the company had known as early 
as 1992 and 1993 that flaws in the construction of the dam posed risks of failure, it is 
hard to imagine that those risks, combined with the large volumes of liquids with 
high cyanide concentrations in storage, did not appear through the eyes of manage­
ment to pose material risks to the company and its investors. 
5 “Technical Causation of the 
Omai Tailings Dam Failure.” 
Submitted to Guyana Geology 
and Mines Commission by 
Dam Review Team, November 
16, 1995. 
6 Report of the Commission of 
Inquiry, p. 40. 
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7 Royal Oak Mines Inc. 
“Quarterly Report.” USSEC. 11­
16-98. Available: www.sec.gov. 
Royal Oak Mining, Ltd. – The Giant Mine, Northwest Territories, Canada 
Royal Oak Mining Ltd. declared bankruptcy in April 1999, citing low gold prices, 
although Royal Oak’s third quarter 1998 report listed assets totaling $840.3 million 
and liabilities totaling $645.8 million.7 The latter excluded the cost of dealing with 
240,000 tons of highly toxic arsenic trioxide buried in underground mining vaults in 
its Giant Mine in Yellowknife in the Northwest Territories that were leaching arsenic 
into ground and surface waters. Recent engineering estimates of the costs of closure 
and remediation are approximately $200 million, against which the government held 
a $0.4 million performance bond for water quality reclamation. 
The Giant Mine went into production in 1948 using a roasting operation to extract 
gold from its arsenopyrite ore, producing arsenic trioxide dust as a waste product. 
The arsenic trioxide dust that was collected was blown underground into mined out 
and some specially constructed chambers for storage 20 to 75 meters below the sur­
face. After 50 years of mining operations, approximately 240,000 tons of arsenic tri­
oxide dust had accumulated underground. Approximately 10-13 tons were added 
every day over the last few decades. 
Royal Oak Mines acquired ownership in 1990 and operated the mine from then until 
April 1999, when it went into bankruptcy. At low gold prices, Giant Mine became a 
break-even operation. Royal Oak Mines went into receivership in April 1999 with no 
provisions to deal with the arsenic trioxide problem, which was left to the federal 
government. Extracting it would be difficult to accomplish without endangering 
workers’ health, since arsenic trioxide can be lethal if inhaled or absorbed through the 
skin and extraction would leave open the question of suitable long-term surface storage. 
At present, after ten years of engineering studies, the government is supporting a plan 
to freeze the arsenic underground and let the arctic permafrost hold it in place, at a dis­
counted present cost of about $100 million. Under this scenario, the pumps would have 
to keep running until the arsenic has leached out of backfilled chambers and vaults, 
which would add an additional $100 million in discounted present costs to the bill. 
Royal Oak never recognized a liability for reclamation of the stored arsenic 
trioxide nor did it discuss the problem in its financial reports. It did provide for 
reclamation of the surface area under the terms of its lease. According to language in 
its 1997 and 1998 annual financial filing: “. . . the Company believes that it has made 
adequate financial provisions for the costs associated with mine closures and 
reclamation, and is of the opinion that any changes to environmental laws and 
regulations in the future should not have a material effect on the Company.” Royal 
Oak did refer to the arsenic trioxide problem in its Water License Annual Report for 
1998, but made no estimate of financial liability on the grounds that studies of various 
remediation options were still underway. 
In other words, in its public disclosures, investors would find no reference to or 
estimate of the very large financial liability that the stored arsenic trioxide represent­
ed, a liability that had been valued at over $120 million in 1993 and subsequently has 
been estimated in the $200 million range. Were these estimates disclosed, the true 
state of Royal Oak’s balance sheet would have been clear well before its declaration of 
bankruptcy in April 1999. 
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Boliden Ltd. – Los Frailes Mine, Spain 
On April 24 and 25, 1998, a large tailings pond dam failed at Spain’s Los Frailes mine, 
owned by the Canadian mining company Boliden Ltd. A slab of soil beneath the dam 
20 meters wide slid downhill approximately one meter. The dam cracked and broke 
abruptly. Between five and seven million cubic meters of acidic, metals-laden water 
and slurries spilled through the gap. Three rivers were affected, along with 11,000 
acres of farmland.8 Damage was also caused in the Doñana National Park, a U.N. 
World Heritage Site. 
The dam failure prompted a 28 percent decrease in the value of Boliden’s stock on 
the Toronto Stock Exchange in the five days after it was reported.9 The event also 
triggered other material consequences. Boliden has spent at least $12 million dollars 
cleaning up the Los Frailes spill.10 On October 2, 2000, Boliden announced that its 
subsidiary Boliden Apirsa had filed a court application for commencement of 
bankruptcy proceedings and that the company would not continue development of 
the Los Frailes mine after October 2001. 
A class action lawsuit was filed by the Canadian law firm Klein Lyons on behalf of 
Boliden’s shareholders. The lawsuit alleges negligence on Boliden’s part and claims mil­
lions of dollars in damages as a result of Boliden’s failure to disclose the risk of the dam 
breach.11 Moreover, on November 16, 2002, Boliden was sued for $89.9 million by the 
Andalucian regional government. Although this case was dismissed on January 2, 2003, 
the regional government is now trying to recover the money through administrative 
channels. On August 2, 2002, the Spanish Council of Ministers demanded that Boliden 
pay $45 million in penalties for the spill. Boliden refused and this demand is still pend­
ing. The Spanish Government has spent over $275 million cleaning up the spill. 
The principal cause of the Los Frailes accident has been established as deficiencies 
in the design and construction of the tailing dam by Boliden’s contractor Dragados y 
Construcciones and its associated engineering firms, Itecsa and Geocisa.12 These defi­
ciencies, coupled with the fragility of clay soil and the high pressures of the water on 
the clay foundation,13 are said to have triggered the dam failure. Essentially, with the 
weight of tailings behind it, a segment of the dam slid downhill on its slick clay base. 
The flow of tailings that escaped through the breach caused a rupture of a 50-meter 
section of the embankment. 
The company knew of these risks. Following complaints in 1995 from the compa­
ny’s own engineer and a Spanish environmental group regarding seepage through the 
dam and possible instability and a 1996 report from engineering consultants that slid­
ing surfaces were forming in the clay underlying the dam, Boliden and the regional 
authorities undertook a series of studies of seepage and the dam’s stability, installed 
monitors within the dam to detect movement, and strengthened seepage contain­
ment works. These steps convinced the authorities to permit Boliden to raise the dam 
to accommodate more tailings from Los Frailes, despite the fact that according to a 
report by Geocisa, a civil engineering firm hired by Boliden, deformations of the 
inclinometers had been observed in 1997, indicating movement in the dam. 
Nothing in Boliden’s annual reports or interim financial statements prior to the 
dam failure mentions any possibility of structural problems in the Los Frailes tailings 
8 Eriksson, N. and P. Adamek. 
“The Tailings Pond Failure at 
the Aznolcollar Mine, Spain.” 
United Nations Environment 
Programme. Mineral 
Resources Forum. Available: 
http:// www.mineralresources 
forum.org/incidents/Losfrailes/ 
9 Coleman, Thomas W. and Ana 
Perales. “Boliden Apirsa, Los 
Frailes Tailings Incident.” 
United Nations Environment 
Programme. Mineral 
Resources Forum. Available: 
http://www.mineralre­
sourcesforum.org/incidents/L 
osfrailes/ 
10 Diehl, Peter. “The Los Frailes 
Tailings Dam Failure.” World 
Information Service on 
Energy, Uranium Project. 
November 10, 2003. Available: 
http://www.antenna.nl/wise 
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11Ibid. 
12 Principa-EQE, Report (1999) 
“Structural Stability of the 
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13 Bolaños, A (8 April 2000) El 
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and Eduardo Alonso, from the 
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dam. The company’s Management Discussion & Analysis prior to the event did not 
treat the risk of a dam failure as a material uncertainty known to management. 
Subsequent to the event, Boliden admitted in a press release dated Feb. 26, 1999 that 
the tailings dam was ill-designed and blamed its contractor Dragados y 
Construcciones and its associated engineering firms Itecsa and Geocisa for the fail­
ure, claiming that their “incorrect interpretation of the geotechnical properties of the 
Margas Azules (Blue Clay) Formation [. . .] facilitated the failure of the tailings 
dam.”14 Faced with claims from Spanish authorities for recovery of damages and 
restoration costs, Boliden warned of possible adverse financial consequences. In 
October 2002, Boliden’s Spanish subsidiary Boliden Apirsa sued the construction 
company Dragados y Construcciones S.A. for a minimum of 107 million Euros. 
Dakota Mining Company – The Gilt Edge Mine, South Dakota, USA 
Gilt Edge Inc., the company eventually reorganized as Dakota Mining Company in 
Canada, was granted a state mining permit in 1986 for the Gilt Edge Mine, a gold heap 
leach project. It finished mining the original reserves in 1992. Despite existing evi­
dence of acidity and the presence of sulfide rocks, the original cash bond for recla­
mation was based on mining non-acid generating rock and totaled $1.2 million. 
During operations waste rock containing enough sulfide minerals to generate acid 
was mined. Acid drainage from the waste dump was detected in 1993. 
On April 19, 1993, in response to the acid problem, the South Dakota Department 
of Environment and Natural Resources issued the company a notice that required it 
to develop a mitigation plan. On March 16, 1995, the Board of Minerals and 
Environment approved the plan. The acid drainage problem raised the 1995 estimat­
ed cost of reclamation and reclamation bond to $8.4 million. The company was able 
to provide only an additional $1.0 million cash bond, with a $6.2 million demand 
note to cover the rest. 
In 1996, the state approved the company’s permit to mine an adjacent site in order 
to generate cash for the reclamation program. However, part of the new site was on 
National Forest land and the Forest Service did not grant approval of the company’s 
environmental impact statement, despite two applications. Consequently, the 
company stopped contributing to the reclamation fund, which then contained $6.2 
million, and in May 1998 informed the state government that it had no money to 
maintain the site or operate the water treatment plant to prevent acid drainage. 
Instead, it filled all the mine pits with 130 million gallons of acidic wastes. By then, 
estimated reclamation costs had reached $13 million. 
Although the governor of South Dakota sued the company to force it to maintain 
the site and operate the plant, the company’s credit was exhausted and in July 1999, it 
declared bankruptcy. The state had the mine listed as a Superfund site in 1999 and has 
already spent $27 million on cleanup, with an estimated $18 million more needed for 
completion. 
From 1996 through its 1999 bankruptcy filing, Dakota Mining consistently under­
estimated its reclamation liabilities at the Gilt Edge mine, even relative to the surety 
required by the state of South Dakota, an amount which itself was considerably less 
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than the actual reclamation cost. For example, in statements repeated in filings 
throughout 1997, the company stated that “the ultimate amount of the reclamation 
obligations to be incurred is uncertain, however the Company estimates these costs 
to be $6.9 million at Gilt Edge Mine ….” According to a government official familiar 
with this case, although it was faced with the problem for years at Gilt Edge, Dakota 
Mining downplayed its potential liabilities from acid mine drainage in order to avoid 
scaring off potential investors.15 
Newmont Mining Corporation – The Midnite Mine, Washington State, USA 
The Midnite Mine was an open-pit uranium mine on the Spokane Indian reservation 
in Washington State. The site contains pits filled with hundreds of millions of gallons 
of contaminated waters, waste rock and tailings. The mine was owned and operated 
by Dawn Mining Company, of which Newmont Mining is majority owner. In April 
1998, the EPA began an Expanded Site Inspection (ESI) that confirmed the elevated 
level of contamination. In February 1999, the EPA proposed that Midnite be added to 
the National Priority List as a Superfund site. This proposal carried important finan­
cial implications for Newmont, the parent company, because CERCLA’s provisions 
for joint and several liability greatly increased the likelihood that it, as the majority 
owner of Dawn Mining, would be held liable for remediation costs at the Midnite 
Mine and possibly the entire cost. A Remedial Action/Feasibility Study was begun. 
Data collections continued from the fall 1999 to the spring of 2000. On May 11, 2000, 
EPA listed the Midnite Mine site on its Superfund National Priorities List. 
Newmont has promptly disclosed material events at the Midnite Mine as they have 
occurred. As the federal government moved toward listing the Midnite Mine as a 
Superfund site, Newmont noted the various phases. In its 1998 10-K report, after EPA 
had proposed the site for the National Priorities List on February 16, 1999, the com­
pany made the following disclosure: “In early 1999, the EPA proposed that the mine 
be included in the National Priorities List under CERCLA. If asserted, the Company 
cannot reasonably predict the likelihood or outcome of any future action against 
Dawn or the Company arising from this matter.”16 In the following year’s 10-K, the 
company mentioned that the RI/FS had begun and moderated its position as to lia­
bility: “In mid-2000, the mine was included on NPL and EPA has initiated a RI/FS 
under CERCLA to determine environmental conditions and remediation options at 
the site. The EPA has asserted that Dawn and the Company are liable . . ..”17 
A year later, the company’s annual report further modifies its potential liability at 
the Midnite Mine: “The environmental standards that may ultimately be imposed at 
this site as a whole remain uncertain and there is a risk that the costs of remediation 
may exceed the provision Newmont’s subsidiary has made for such remediation by a 
material amount. Whenever a previously unrecognized remediation liability becomes 
known or a previously estimated cost is increased, the amount of that liability or 
additional cost is expensed and this can materially reduce net income in that 
period.”18 
However, in subsequent filings through 2003, the company has maintained that 
since remediation requirements at the Midnite have not been finally decided, it 
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cannot estimate its potential liability and intends vigorously to contest claims against 
it. Since the EPA had not completed its RI/FS by the end of 2003, even to the extent 
of releasing the estimated costs associated with its retained remediation alternatives, 
and had not issued a Record of Decision, Newmont could plausibly claim that it 
could not estimate its potential liability. However, when the Midnite Mine was put 
under CERCLA’s provisions, the company became subject to specific SEC and FASB 
disclosure requirements. Those requirements prohibit the company from deferring 
disclosure until a single cost estimate had been established and require it to provide 
a range of possible liabilities if such a range could reasonably be estimated. Newmont 
had not provided even a range of potential reclamation costs. In late 2003, an asset 
management company filed a shareholder resolution with Newmont calling for fuller 
disclosure of environmental liabilities. 
Teck Cominco – The Red Dog Mine, Alaska, USA 
On July 15, 2002, the Kivalina Relocation Planning Committee of the village of 
Kivalina, a small traditional Inuit community, notified Teck Cominco Alaska, 
operator of the Red Dog Mine, that they were going to sue the company under the 
citizens’ suit provisions of the Clean Water Act for up to $88 million in penalties for 
more than 3,000 violations of the Clean Water Act at the mine and the associated port 
facility. The suit charges that the mine regularly violated its discharge permits 
regarding effluents of cyanide and total dissolved solids and also discharged excessive 
quantities of heavy metals. The case was dismissed on the grounds that the plaintiff 
was not a “person” but the six individual members have filed a new suit making 
similar claims. 
The Red Dog Mine site is in the western Brooks Range, approximately 600 miles 
north of Anchorage and 55 miles inland. It is the largest zinc mine in the world, pro­
ducing 1.2 million tons of lead and zinc concentrates annually. These are then trans­
ported by road to a port site storage facility. Teck Cominco Alaska, a subsidiary of 
Teck Cominco,18 operates the mine under an agreement with Northwest Alaska Native 
Association Regional Corporation (NANA), which owns the land where the mine 
and port are located. 
The Red Dog Mine has a history of water quality problems, which baseline geo­
logic and engineering studies done in the 1980s foretold. In July 1997, Cominco Alaska 
settled a federal government suit alleging hundreds of violations of the Clean Water 
Act through exceeding permitted levels of metals and pH at its wastewater pit. In the 
settlement, Cominco paid a $1.7 million fine, upgraded its water treatment plant, and 
agreed to spend more than $3 million on long-term ongoing monitoring and ecolog­
ical studies. These studies showed that mine effluents had no incremental adverse 
impacts on water quality in Red Dog Creek, given that high background contaminant 
levels made it already unfit for aquatic life. 
However, water quality problems continued at the mine. The two year compliance 
record available online at EPA’s Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance 
shows that Red Dog Mine was non-compliant with provisions of the Clean Water Act 
in all 8 quarterly periods from October 2001 through September 2003. 
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Concentrations of total dissolved solids exceeded permitted levels by 1800 percent 
in the last quarter of 2001 and cyanide concentrations exceeded permitted levels by 
100 percent in 2002. During this period the company operated under a compliance 
order under consent, while it negotiated with EPA for a much less stringent permit 
level for total dissolved solids and an alternative method for estimating cyanide con­
centrations, both of which were granted in 2003. 
A June 2001 study for the Alaska Department of Fish and Game Restoration found 
that effluents from the Red Dog Mine over the period June 27, 1996 to June 27, 1997 
had high concentrations of sulfate ions (1800-1900 mg/l), high concentrations of cal­
cium ions (590-665 mg/l), high concentrations of total dissolved solids (2700-2740 
mg/l) and that, on balance, the effluent was highly acidic, all at levels that would have 
been toxic to salmon and other aquatic organisms, had they existed in the 10-mile 
stretch downstream of the mine. 
In June 2001, a study for the National Park Service found elevated levels of lead, 
zinc and cadmium along the road leading from the mine to the port through a 
national park. The company subsequently addressed emissions from the hauling 
trucks. In September 2001, the Alaska Community Action on Toxics released 
information that monitoring of the port site from 1990 to 1996 had found lead 
concentrations in soils as much as 36 times the state of Alaska’s threshold for 
remediation requirements and more than twice as high as the threshold for zinc 
contamination. 
In short, Teck Cominco was aware of its environmental problems at the Red Dog 
Mine and its  record of permit violations over the decade preceding the suit because 
of its mandated monitoring and reporting programs, monitoring by outside bodies, 
and records of non-compliance kept by government environmental agencies. It also 
knew that operating under a compliance order by consent did not shield it from cit­
izen lawsuits under the Clean Water Act. 
Teck Cominco took note of the lawsuit in its 2002 Annual Report’s Environment, 
Health and Safety Section: “A Committee from the community near the Red Dog 
mine brought proceedings against Teck Cominco alleging violations of the Clean 
Water Act and the mine’s water discharge permits. The vast majority of the alleged 
incidents were permitted through compliance orders issued by the EPA and Teck 
Cominco Alaska has worked closely with the regulatory authorities and NANA to 
meet the concerns of the community of Kivalina.” 
Prior to the time the suit was announced, none of the company’s filings give any 
indication that the pattern of non-compliance extending over a period of years might 
create a financial risk or exposure. For that matter, the company’s disclosures do not 
reveal ongoing non-compliance. Neither the Management Discussion & Analysis nor 
the Environmental Matters sections of the company’s reports treat the issue as a risk 
or uncertainty known to management. The company holds that the lawsuit was not 
a material event, although in the five day window surrounding its announcement, the 
company’s stock price fell by 10 percent. 
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MAIN REPORT 
why is disclosure important? 
Mandatory disclosure is a widely used public policy instrument, employed to protect 
the public and to improve the performance of businesses and government in fields as 
diverse as food safety, fuel efficiency, management of toxic substances, and sales of 
financial securities. Disclosure is a policy tool that relies on informed consumer and 
public choice rather than on direct regulation. Disclosure increases market efficiency 
by eliminating informational asymmetries between sellers and potential buyers that 
can distort market prices and sometimes deter market transactions altogether. 
Publicity provides strong incentives for business and government managers to 
improve performance by preventing them from shielding inferior or excessively risky 
products and services behind a veil of secrecy. 
Improved disclosure will increase the efficiency with which financial markets 
allocate capital. At present, because information is not adequately available about 
environmental exposures that may affect future costs, earnings, and capital outlays, 
investors have difficulty in identifying companies that have better prospects and 
lower risks. Several studies of environmentally sensitive industries, such as oil and 
gas, pulp and paper, motor vehicles, and electric power have demonstrated that 
individual companies within those sectors vary widely in their financial exposure to 
impending environmental developments, largely because of the companies’ past 
business decisions.20 
These differences in exposure can lead to competitive advantages and disadvan­
tages among companies within an industry and highly material impacts on share­
holder value for the most exposed companies. In environmentally sensitive indus­
tries, the success with which companies manage their environmental risks can be a 
significant determinant of their value. Efficient functioning of financial markets 
depends on the extent to which they can accurately translate companies’ exposures 
and competitive positions into assessments of financial value and risk, on the basis of 
available information. 
The effectiveness of mandatory disclosure as a policy instrument has been rein­
forced in the last two decades by several ongoing trends. The development of the 
internet and of communications technology has dramatically improved the ease and 
speed of communication and has lowered its costs. Also, in many industries, more of 
a company’s market value now consists of intangible assets, including its brands and 
business reputation. Since strategic alliances, supplier networks, complex chains of 
financial relationships, and other networks have become an increasingly prominent 
aspect of the business world, impairment of a firm’s reputation can be a devastating 
loss. Reputational losses can also undermine consumers’ brand loyalty and make it 
more difficult for a company to recruit and retain high quality employees. 
In the environmental realm, mandatory disclosure programs have been notably 
successful. The U.S. EPA’s Toxic Release Inventory has not only informed the public 
about potential hazards in their communities, it has also provided a strong stimulus 
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to companies generating reportable quantities of toxic substances to reduce their 
generation and release.21 Subsequent to the publication of TRI data, prominent 
companies such as Dupont and Dow Chemical, among many others, entered into 
voluntary commitments to achieve major reductions, largely through pollution 
prevention initiatives. Explaining these commitments, CEOs of these companies have 
cited the need to protect their firms’ reputations. It has also been documented that 
the companies with the largest reported quantities of toxic materials in the inventory 
experienced adverse stock market reactions, adding a financial impetus to their 
pollution reduction efforts. 
In Canada, the National Pollution Release Inventory (NPRI) has had a similar suc­
cess, prompting many companies to embark on accelerated pollution prevention and 
reduction programs.22 Emissions reporting requirements such as the TRI and NPRI 
stimulated managers in some companies to quantify emissions on a plant and com-
pany-wide basis for the first time. On the principle that “You manage what you meas­
ure,” this expanded measurement by itself encouraged better environmental control. 
In addition, greater transparency discouraged management from pursuing unduly 
risky environmental policies that might save money in the short-run but would 
expose the company and the public to excessive potential damages in the longer run. 
The requirement that companies disclose to the investment community the 
material financial implications of their environmental exposures is also increasingly 
important. When the Securities and Exchange Acts of 1933 and 1934 enshrined 
disclosure as the principal means for regulating financial markets in the United 
States, Justice Brandeis said, “Sunlight is the best disinfectant.” Since then, financial 
disclosure has become even more powerful, for several reasons. For one, the influence 
of external financial markets on management decision-making has become more 
pronounced. Within financial markets, an ever-larger percentage of assets are 
controlled by institutional money managers, who are capable of large, rapid portfolio 
shifts in response to new information. Consequently, unpleasant surprises can lead to 
massive sell-offs of a company’s securities and rapid declines in their value. This is 
particularly true when the surprising information undermines investor confidence in 
a company’s management and raises investor uncertainty about possible future 
revelations. 
For example, the stock of Solutia, a company formed when Monsanto spun off its 
chemical division, plunged by almost 60 percent within a few weeks when an article 
in the Washington Post revealed that Monsanto had dumped tons of PCBs in 
Anniston, Alabama, and had covered up its behavior for decades. The company’s 
behavior was deemed to be “outrageous” by an Alabama jury that held the company 
liable for negligence, suppression of truth, and nuisance, which opened Solutia to fur­
ther lawsuits. In another well-known case, the stock of U.S. Liquids, a Houston waste 
management firm, fell 58 percent in one week when employees revealed to govern­
ment authorities that the company had illegally dumped hazardous wastes and falsi­
fied records. Consequently, shareholders filed suit against the company for violation 
of securities law by issuing false and misleading reports and failing to disclose mate­
rial information. Now, U.S. Liquids has itself been liquidated. 
21 A. Fung and D. O’Rourke, 
2000, “Reinventing 
Environmental Regulation 
from the Grassroots Up: 
Explaining and Expanding 
the Success of the Toxic 
Release Inventory”, 
Environmental Management; 
25, 115-127. 
22 K. Harrison and W. Antweiler, 
2003, “Incentives for 
Pollution Abatement: 
Regulation, Regulatory 
Threat, and Non-
Governmental Pressures,” 
Journal of Policy Analysis and 
Management, 22(3); 361-382. 
yale school of forestry & environmental studies 
18 silence is golden, leaden, and copper 
23 Robert C. Eccles et al., The 
Value Reporting Revolution, 
Wiley, NY, 2001; ch.7. 
24 Robert Repetto and Duncan 
Austin, “A Quantitative 
Approach to Strategic 
Environmental Risk 
Management,” with Duncan 
Austin, in Peter N. Nemetz, 
ed., Bringing Business on 
Board, JBA Press, Vancouver, 
2002. 
25 Robert Repetto and J. 
Henderson, “Environmental 
Exposures in the U.S. Electric 
Utility Industry,” Utilities 
Policy, (11) 103-111; 2003. 
These instances illustrate not only the power of publicity in financial markets but 
also the temptations into which managers can fall when imprudent or improper 
activities can be hidden from public scrutiny. As managers’ compensation is more 
closely tied to stock market performance through stock options and performance-
linked bonuses and as financial analysts focus ever more closely on quarter-by-quar­
ter earnings, the temptation to manage earnings through short-sighted strategies has 
become more powerful. Although in recent years this has been seen most obviously 
in accounting irregularities and financial engineering perpetrated by such companies 
as Enron and Worldcom, the temptation to pursue shortsighted environmental prac­
tices may be no less strong. The Solutia and U.S. Liquids experiences also illustrate the 
dramatic damages that can be suffered by companies and investors through lack of 
transparency regarding environmental risks and exposures. The recent corporate 
scandals have reduced investor confidence in corporate management to a minimum 
and, if anything, have increased the potential damages to companies and investors 
when hidden information becomes public. 
Yet, there is a significant unmet need in financial markets for greater disclosure of 
material environmental information. At present, although some companies release 
environmental reports and statements, these are very rarely linked to financial reports, 
nor are their financial implications explained. Financial analysts report difficulty in 
linking environmental to financial information. Consequently, analysts typically place 
little weight on environmental factors in evaluating a security’s risks and potential 
returns, even in those sectors in which such factors are demonstrably significant.23 
Despite a general rule in the securities laws of the United States and Canada that 
publicly traded companies disclose all financially material information in a timely 
manner, few companies with significant environmental exposures actually provide 
such information in their financial statements and filings. A study of thirteen large 
companies in the U.S. pulp and paper industry found that, for the most exposed 
companies, the most likely estimate of the financial impact of important impending 
environmental rules was an 8 to 10 percent loss in total shareholder value. Yet only 
three of the thirteen companies mentioned those environmental issues at all in their 
financial statements, and those three did so only in a cursory qualitative fashion.24 
Comparable studies in other industries have arrived at similar findings.25 
The lack of material environmental information is especially pronounced in those 
sections of financial reports intended to disclose business trends and uncertainties 
significant for the company’s future earnings and financial conditions, such as the 
Management Discussion & Analysis section. A report recently made public by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission on their review of financial statements filed by 
the Fortune 500 largest U.S. companies stated: 
“We found that we issued more comments on the MD&A discussions of the 
Fortune 500 companies than any other topic. Item 303 of Regulation S-K 
requires . . . [a discussion of] known material events and uncertainties that 
would cause reported financial information not to be necessarily indicative 
of future operating results or of future financial conditions . . .. Our 
comments addressed situations where companies simply recited financial 
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statement information without analysis or presented boilerplate analysis that 
did not provide any insight into the companies’ past performance or 
business prospects as understood by management.”26 
Such information is crucial for investors because the value of securities depends on 
the stream of future returns and their riskiness. In many industries, future returns 
and risks are significantly affected by environmental exposures. Because these are 
inadequately disclosed and analyzed, investors often suffer sudden and significant 
losses when those risks materialize. Most of these occurrences were the culmination 
of environmental exposures and risks that existed beforehand but were not disclosed 
and were not understood by investors, who consequently suffered serious losses. 
Financial markets are now asserting a growing demand for transparency, in part 
because of these experiences. According to a recent Standard and Poor’s 
Transparency and Disclosure Study (available at www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/ 
pdf/products/WhitePaper.pdf), 
“Public companies around the world are increasingly under pressure from 
the ongoing ‘corporate governance revolution’ in which large institutional 
investors are intensifying the pressure on management to disclose all 
material information.” 
A corroborating study by the accounting and consulting firm Ernst and Young 
found, after a study of share performance in the 1000 largest global companies, that 
poor investor relations was the third most frequent cause of sudden and major drops 
in share value. Companies that are lax on disclosure are more vulnerable to share 
price volatility than those that provide qualitatively good information. Moreover, 
investors have shown that they are willing to pay a premium for companies with 
superior disclosure records.27 
In the United States and also in Canada, in the wake of corporate scandals, new 
requirements have been adopted requiring CEOs and CFOs to certify the accuracy 
and completeness of their financial statements and MD&As, requiring more inde­
pendence of corporate directors from management, requiring corporation lawyers to 
take action if accounting or reporting irregularities are discovered and not corrected, 
and requiring separation of auditing and advisory functions. In addition, the current 
U.S. administration and Congress have markedly increased appropriations of funds 
to strengthen the enforcement capabilities of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, which itself has taken steps to tighten disclosure standards. 
The demand for more disclosure extends to environmental information. The SEC 
review of Fortune 500 company disclosures found specifically that information on 
environmental exposures and liabilities was frequently deficient. 
An increasing number of shareholder resolutions are being filed asking manage­
ment for disclosure of material environmental information. 
●	 In Canada, shareholders of Imperial Oil recently submitted a resolution 
requiring the company to spell out potential financial liabilities associated 
with its greenhouse gas emissions and to put in place a plan to reduce 
those liabilities. 
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●	 In the United States, in 2003, an investor coalition that includes the State 
of Connecticut’s [Retirement] Plans and Trust Fund filed resolutions with 
five of the largest U.S. electric power companies requesting that they 
disclose to shareholders the economic risks associated with emissions of 
carbon dioxide and other air pollutants and the business benefits 
associated with reducing those emissions. In an important recent 
development, Institutional Shareholder Services, an organization that 
advises pension and mutual fund managers on how to vote their proxies, 
endorsed these shareholder resolutions.28 This endorsement potentially 
adds institutional money managers controlling hundreds of billions of 
dollars in assets to those demanding more environmental transparency. 
●	 The Carbon Disclosure Project, an even larger initiative backed by thirty-

five of the world’s largest institutional investors, has been urging
 
companies to disclose their greenhouse gas emissions and the risks they
 
pose to the companies, and the extent of their emission reduction
 
programs.
 
Another trend sustaining the demand for more environmental disclosure is the 
increasing share of investor assets held in environmentally screened or “socially 
responsible” mutual funds and portfolios. Such portfolios now hold at least a trillion 
dollars in assets. 
Their growth has been stimulated by two factors. First, the replacement of defined-
benefit pension plans with defined-contribution plans, in which beneficiaries have 
greater control over asset allocation, has led money management firms to create and 
offer screened portfolios or funds as an investment choice. For this reason, among 
others, almost all major investment houses now have staff responsible for environ­
mental evaluation and research. Second, the demonstration in recent years that 
screened portfolios often provide risk-adjusted returns superior or equal to 
unscreened benchmarks has encouraged investors to allocate at least a portion of 
their assets to the environmentally screened portfolios. Both factors in combination 
contribute to the demand for financially relevant environmental information. 
First-generation screens merely eliminated companies or entire industries that 
were deemed socially unacceptable. They are being replaced by research carried out 
by such firms as IRRC, KLD, Innovest, Trucost and Sustainable Asset Management 
that seek to understand which companies are likely to provide higher risk-adjusted 
returns by virtue of their superior environmental and sustainability practices. 
These developments have reinforced financial market demand for relevant 
environmental information. Such information should be available under existing 
general requirements in the securities laws of Canada and the United States that 
companies promptly disclose all material information, since some environmental 
information is clearly of material financial importance. In addition, there are more 
detailed and specific environmental disclosure requirements in U.S. and Canadian 
securities regulations that have been clarified through published accounting 
yale school of forestry & environmental studies 
robert repetto 21 
standards and explanatory releases by securities regulators. These detailed disclosure 
requirements cover such matters as the costs of compliance with environmental 
regulation, liabilities for remediation and restoration of contaminated property, 
potential damages from environmentally-related legal actions, and other known 
environmental risks and uncertainties. 
However, concerns have been raised regarding the extent to which these require­
ments are being complied with or enforced, partly as the result of the sector studies 
and individual cases mentioned above. Last year the U.S. Senate requested the 
General Accounting Office to investigate the adequacy of environmental disclosure by 
corporations publicly listed on U.S. securities markets, and the adequacy of the SEC’s 
enforcement of its own requirements. This request followed the release of a 1998 
study by EPA that found that 74 percent of the companies subject to environmental 
legal proceedings that should have been disclosed under SEC rules had failed to do 
so. In Europe as well, the European Commission issued stricter non-binding guide­
lines in 2001 for disclosure of environmental costs and liabilities in response to a find­
ing that unreliable and inadequate information about environmental performance 
“makes it difficult for investors . . . to form a clear and accurate picture of the impact 
of environmental factors on a company’s performance or to make comparisons 
between companies.”29 
In fact, enforcement of environmental disclosure requirements in the past has 
been minimal. In Canada, only a single case involving environmental disclosure was 
brought by securities regulators within a period of twenty-five years. In the United 
States, only a handful of cases were raised.30 Enforcement has not been vigorous in 
years past because environmental issues were not salient among all the securities reg­
ulatory issues that the responsible agencies were faced with. Moreover, those agencies 
have typically been under-staffed and under-funded to the extent that they were able 
to deal with only the most urgent and egregious issues.31 
The lack of enforcement effort has weakened compliance with disclosure regula­
tions. Further, this has led to the misperception among some financial analysts and 
investors that, since little environmental information was included in financial dis­
closures, such information must not have been material. 
why focus on the hardrock mining sector? 
These considerations are extremely relevant to the mining industry. According to the 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, aside from global warming, mining presents 
the most significant threat to ecosystems around the world. A modern open pit mine 
extracts hundreds of millions of tons of earth, rock and ore, disrupting the landscape 
and in many instances blocking or contaminating waterways. It processes extracted 
ores in the open, using such toxic chemicals as cyanide and sulfuric acid. It exposes 
native rock and mineral waste to oxygen and water so that acids and heavy metals 
leach into surface and ground water. When mining ceases, remediation and reclama­
tion of the pit and surrounding waste can require decades of work and cost hundreds 
of millions of dollars. 
29 Donald Sutherland, “Europe 
Tightens Corporate 
Environmental Accounting 
Rules,” Environmental News 
Service, Brussels, October 5, 
2001. 
30 Commission on 
Environmental Cooperation, 
Environmental Disclosure 
Requirements in the 
Securities Regulations and 
Financial Accounting 
Standards of Mexico, Canada 
and the United States, 
Montreal, 2002. 
31 U.S. Government Accounting 
Office, SEC Operations: 
Increased Workload Creates 
Challenges, Washington, 
Govt. Printing Office, March 
2002. 
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Mines throughout the United States and Canada are responsible for major 
environmental impacts on land, air and water quality. In the U.S., EPA estimates that 
mining has polluted 40 percent of western watersheds, where most mining occurs. 
The EPA has also identified the mining industry as the largest toxic polluter in the 
U.S. There are tens of thousands of abandoned mine sites throughout western North 
America, many of which are still causing environmental damage. 
Mining companies have often understated such impacts in permit applications, 
environmental impact assessments, and financial prospectuses. This pattern of 
performance has had significant financial consequences. When faced with the costs of 
remediation, mining companies have sometimes declared bankruptcy, to the 
detriment of creditors and shareholders. Taxpayers have been forced to assume the 
clean-up costs of abandoned mining sites. In past years, cases have been brought by 
citizens or by securities regulators in the U.S. and Canada alleging inadequate 
disclosure of material environmental liabilities. No new paragraph here. Follow on 
“In September . . . In September  1998, Local 890 of the United Steelworkers’ Union 
brought suit in federal court, alleging that Phelps Dodge had failed over a period of 
years to disclose releases of large volumes of toxic materials at its mining operations 
in New Mexico. At the close of 2003, the Boston Common Asset Management Group 
filed a shareholder resolution with Newmont Mining Corporation calling on the 
company to report on the risk to the company’s operations, profitability and 
reputation from its social and environmental liabilities. A spokesperson for the 
Group stated, “Newmont Mining senior executives purport to be committed to 
sustainable development but we continue to have concerns as investors that the 
company is not fully disclosing its social and environmental liabilities. We feel that 
Newmont needs to disclose not only its potential liabilities but also what policies the 
company will put in place to avoid those costs in the future.32 These and other 
examples illustrate the need to examine more broadly the disclosure practices in the 
mining sector. 
what disclosure requirements apply to u.s. and
canadian mining companies? 
Essential Features of Applicable Disclosure Requirements in Canada 
Securities regulation falls within the responsibilities of the provincial governments 
but Ontario’s regulations generally set the standard. The securities disclosure regime 
begins with the requirement that a preliminary and final prospectus be filed33 
containing “full, true and plain disclosure of all material facts relating to the securities 
issued or proposed to be distributed.”34 ‘Material fact’ is defined by the Ontario 
Securities Commission as “a fact that significantly affects, or would reasonably be 
expected to have a significant effect on, the market price or value of such securities.35 
Material changes, defined as “. . . a change in the business, operations or capital of the 
issuer that would reasonably be expected to have a significant effect on the market 
price or value of any of the securities of the issuer,” must also be promptly disclosed.36 
Any material change in the affairs of a reporting issuer must be disclosed to securities 
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regulators and to the public through a press release by a senior officer of the company 
that describes the nature and substance of the development.37 
The legislation appears to set up separate disclosure requirements for material 
facts and changes. However, provincial securities commissions and stock exchanges 
have largely eliminated this distinction; instead, there is an obligation to make con­
tinuous and timely disclosure of all material information that arises in the affairs of 
a reporting issuer, a category including both material facts and changes.38 
Disclosure Requirements of Environmental Information 
To the extent that environmental information could reasonably be expected to influ­
ence investors’ decisions or securities prices, it must be disclosed under existing reg­
ulations. In addition, there are specific disclosure requirements pertaining to envi­
ronmental information. 
The prospectus must include a narrative description of the business of the issuer, 
including “. . . the financial and operational effects of environmental protection 
requirements on the capital expenditures, earnings and competitive position of the 
issuer in the current financial year and the expected effect, on future years.”39 The 
issuer must also list “risk factors material to the issuer that a reasonable investor 
would consider relevant to an investment in the securities being distributed,” such as 
“environmental and health risks.” 
Securities law requires the reporting issuer to set out in its annual information 
form the impact of the following environmental criteria on its business generally and 
to list for the affected industry segments “. . . the financial or operational effect of 
environmental protection requirements on the capital expenditures, earnings and 
competitive position of the Issuer for the current fiscal year and any expected impact 
on future years.”40 
According to the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants, the following gen­
eral provisions would also apply:41 Under Part III, Management Discussion & 
Analysis, Item 1(4)(a), para. 124, environmental expenses that are unusual or infre­
quent events or transactions or otherwise represent any significant economic change 
materially affecting income from operations must be disclosed, along with the extent 
to which the income from operations are affected. 
If disclosure of an environmental risk or uncertainty is necessary for an under­
standing of the Issuer’s financial condition, changes therein, or results of operations, 
it should be disclosed under Part III, MD&A, Item 1(1)(3), para.108, with particular 
emphasis on risks over the next two years. Recent guidance issued by CICA on 
MD&A disclosures emphasizes companies’ obligations to provide management’s 
assessment of future value drivers and material trends and uncertainties, giving 
investors a realistic portrayal of the business outlook and prospects as seen by man­
agement, not simply a boilerplate narrative reiteration of current financial data.42 
Disclosure requirements for natural resource companies in British Columbia are 
particularly relevant for mining companies. Regulations require substantial disclo­
sure of the financial impact of environmental regulations.43 Concerning proposed 
exploration and development programs, they require disclosure where environmen­
37 OSA, s. 75(1); ASA, s. 118(1)(a); 
BCSA, s. 85(1)(a). 
38 First published (1987), 10 
Ontario .Securities 
Commission. Bulletin 
(O.S.C.B.). 6295; restated 
(1993), 16 O.S.C.B. 2722. 
39 Published in (2000) 23 
O.S.C.B. (Supp.) 685. The same 
criteria is found in Ontario 
Securities Commission 
Supplement General 
Prospectus Requirements 
(2000), 23 OSCB (Supp.) 795, 
with the costs of environ­
mental compliance dealt 
with also at 6.1 (1), 4. (h), and 
risk factors at item 20.1(1)(h). 
40 First published in (1989) 
O.S.C.B. 4275, as am. by
 
(1990) 13 O.S.C.B. 943.
 
41 Moore, David J. ed., 
Accounting for Environmental 
Costs and Liabilities (Toronto: 
CICA, 1993). 
42 Canadian Institute of 
Chartered Accountants, 
Management Discussion and 
Analysis Guidance 
Document, Toronto, 2002. 
43 British Columbia Securities 
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Notices Weekly Summary, 
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tal restrictions are likely to have an effect on operations. They also require environ­
mental regulations to be listed again under the heading of “risk factors,” where such 
regulation could be a material financial risk to an investor. For the mining industry 
in particular, regulations in British Columbia require the disclosure, to the extent 
known, of all environmental liabilities to which the property is subject and call on the 
issuer to include a discussion in the Technical Report of environmental bond posting, 
remediation and reclamation obligations, if applicable. 
In Canada, companies must present their financial statements according to GAAP. 
The CICA Handbook is an authoritative source of GAAP, including the proper treat­
ment of environmental liabilities. Section 3060 of the Handbook requires that an 
accrual for the future removal and site restoration costs be made through charges to 
income.” Section 3060 also states that these future environmental liabilities are to be 
reported only “when the likelihood of their incidence is established as a result of envi­
ronmental law, contract, or because the enterprise has established a policy to restore 
a site.” Future expenditures are to be recognized in financial statements if the trans­
action or event has already occurred. The CICA's position is that past environmental 
damage is definitely a triggering event when there is environmental legislation that 
requires a company to undertake remediation. 
Environmental Disclosure Requirements in U.S. Securities Regulations 
In addition to extensive specific disclosure requirements set forth largely in 
Regulation S-K, the Securities and Exchange Acts lay on companies a far more general 
obligation to disclose all material information needed to make required statements 
not misleading. This requirement applies to securities registrations, prospectuses, 
proxy statements, and periodic reports. Making false or misleading facts or omitting 
to disclose a material fact that is needed to make other statements not misleading 
opens a company and its officers to severe penalties, including criminal prosecution, 
civil penalties, withdrawal of registration, and private lawsuits by investors who have 
suffered damages. Recently, the Sarbanes-Oxley Bill placed legal requirements on 
CEOs and CFOs of publicly traded companies to certify the completeness and 
accuracy of their financial disclosures and increased the responsibilities of company 
directors. 
A materiality filter has been applied to distinguish information that companies 
must disclose, including environmental information. Moreover, in response to 
National Resources Defense Council’s rulemaking petition, the SEC clarified its posi­
tion that, insofar as environmental information is material, its disclosure is required 
under securities law and that requirement would be enforced.44 
The concept of materiality has been clarified in litigation and interpretive releases. 
Material information is information that a reasonable investor would find significant, 
in the total mix of available information. In SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No.99, 
devoted to materiality, the Commission reminded companies that no numerical 
benchmark could be relied upon as a threshold of materiality. Rather, “a matter is 
material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable person would consider it 
important.”45 The Bulletin quotes a judgment by the U.S. Supreme Court to the effect 
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that a fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that the fact would have been 
viewed by a reasonable investor as having significantly altered the total mix of infor­
mation made available.46 The Bulletin cites examples of misstatements or omissions 
that might be material although quantitatively small in financial terms. Among these 
are mis-statements bearing on the integrity or competence of management, such as a 
company’s compliance with environmental regulatory requirements. 
The SEC has issued regulations, instructions and interpretative and explanatory 
releases that have created an extensive and highly integrated disclosure system. The 
disclosure rules are specified in detail in Regulation S-K.47 These information require­
ments have been standardized to a large extent across several important disclosure 
stages specified in the Securities and Exchange Acts. They include: 
1)	 information contained in a prospectus or similar document when 
securities are offered for sale to the public or otherwise distributed; 
2)	 information contained in a statement accompanying the registration 
of securities with the Securities and Exchange Commission; 
3)	 information contained in proxy solicitations in conjunction with the 
election of officers and votes in annual meetings; and, 
4)	 information contained in required annual, quarterly, and special 
ongoing reports filed with the SEC and made available to the public. 
Some disclosure requirements apply specifically to information of an 
environmental nature. However, the SEC has stated that compliance with such 
specific disclosure requirements does not obviate the firm’s obligation to comply with 
more general requirement that all material information must be revealed.48 For 
example, if a company makes public disclosure of its environmental policies, it must 
ensure that statements made are accurate and sufficient to make the information not 
misleading. 
Section 101 c) xii) of Regulation S-K specifies: 
“Appropriate disclosure also shall be made as to the material effects that 
compliance with Federal, State and local provisions which have been enact­
ed or adopted regulating the discharge of materials into the environment, or 
otherwise relating to the protection of the environment, may have upon the 
capital expenditures, earnings and competitive position of the registrant and 
its subsidiaries. The registrant shall disclose any material estimated capital 
expenditures for environmental control facilities for the remainder of its 
current fiscal year and its succeeding fiscal year and for such further periods 
as the registrant may deem material.” 
In an interpretive release, the SEC made it clear that companies may have to make 
and disclose estimates of environmental compliance costs in future years if they 
expect such costs to be material and significantly higher than current costs.49 For 
example, most environmental regulations are enacted with a compliance deadline set 
46 TSC Industries v. Northway, 
Inc, 426U.S. 438, 449 (1976). 
47 CFR§§229.10 – 229.702(1998). 
48SEC Release No. 33-6130; 
44FR56925. 
49 SEC Release No. 33-6130; 
44FR56924, Oct. 3, 1979. 
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in the future, so that future year capital expenditures might substantially exceed those 
expected in the current year. 
The distinction between provisions that have been enacted and those that have 
been adopted is significant in the United States system, because many environmental 
regulations that are enacted are not adopted for months or years thereafter because 
of legal challenges. Section 101c) xii) requires disclosure of the material effects of reg­
ulations enacted but not yet adopted. 
In addition, though not targeted exclusively at litigation arising out of environ­
mental matters, Section 103 of Regulation S-K requires disclosure of pending materi­
al legal proceedings: 
“Describe briefly any material pending legal proceedings, other than 
ordinary routine litigation incidental to the business, to which the registrant 
or any of its subsidiaries is a party or of which any of their property is the 
subject.” 
The instructions for Item 103 stipulate that 
“. . . No information need be given with respect to any proceeding that 
involves primarily a claim for damages if the amount involved, exclusive of 
interest and costs, does not exceed 10 percent of the current assets of the 
registrant and its subsidiaries on a consolidated basis. “. . . Notwithstanding 
the foregoing, an administrative or judicial proceeding (including . . . 
proceedings which present in large degree the same issues) arising under any 
Federal, State or local provisions that have been enacted or adopted 
regulating the discharge of materials into the environment or primary for 
the purpose of protecting the environment shall not be deemed “ordinary 
routine litigation incidental to the business” and shall be described if: 
A.	 Such proceeding is material to the business or financial condition of the 
registrant; 
B.	 Such proceeding involves primarily a claim for damages, or involves 
potential monetary sanctions, capital expenditures, deferred charges or 
charges to income and the amount involved, exclusive of interest and 
costs, exceeds 10 percent of the current assets of the registrant and its 
subsidiaries on a consolidated basis; or 
C.	 A governmental authority is a party to such proceeding and such 
proceeding involves potential monetary sanctions, unless the registrant 
reasonably believes that such proceeding will result in no monetary 
sanctions, or in monetary sanctions, exclusive of interest and costs, of 
less than $100,000; provided, however, that such proceedings which are 
similar in nature may be grouped and described generically.” 
Another disclosure requirement imposed by Regulation S-K with great potential 
significance for environmental information is Item 303, which specifies the 
requirements for the Management Discussion & Analysis, a narrative explanation 
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that accompanies the financial reports. Item 303 requires a disclosure and discussion 
of any known trends, commitments, events or uncertainties that will have a material 
effect on the firm’s financial condition or results of operation. The instructions to 
Item 303 state inter alia: 
“. . . The  discussion and analysis shall focus specifically on material events 
and uncertainties known to management that would cause reported 
financial information not to be necessarily indicative of future operating 
results or of future financial condition . . ..” 
The scope of this requirement was further explained in an interpretive release, which 
states that 
“A disclosure duty exists where a trend, demand, commitment, event or 
uncertainty is both presently known to management and reasonably likely to 
have material effects on the registrant’s financial condition or results of 
operation.” 
This release shifts the burden of proof onto management, in that known uncertain­
ties must be disclosed unless management can determine that a material effect “is not 
reasonably likely to occur.”50 In its explanation of this requirement, the SEC used a 
hypothetical proposed government safety regulation affecting a company’s opera­
tions as an example. In deciding whether this proposed regulation must be disclosed, 
the SEC stated: 
“. . . management must make two assessments: 
(1)	 Is the known trend, demand, commitment, trend or uncertainty likely 
to come to fruition? If management determines that it is not reason­
ably likely to occur, no disclosure is required. 
(2) If management cannot make that determination, it must evaluate 
objectively the consequences of the known trend, demand, commit­
ment, event, or uncertainty on the assumption that it will come to 
fruition. Disclosure is then required unless management determines 
that a material effect on the registrant’s condition or results of opera­
tions is not reasonably likely to occur.”51 
In this release, the SEC pointed out that events that have already occurred or are 
anticipated may give rise to material known uncertainties. It warns registrants that 
“Where a material change in the company’s financial condition or results of 
operations appears in a reporting period and the likelihood of such change 
was not discussed in prior reports, the Commission staff, as part of its review 
of the current filing, will inquire as to the circumstances existing at the time 
of the earlier filings to determine whether the registrant failed to discuss a 
known trend, demand, commitment, event or uncertainty as required by 
”52Item 303.
50 SEC Release No. 33-6835; 
54FR22430, May 24, 1989. 
51 54FR22430. 
52 SEC Release No. 33-6835; 
54FR22431, n28, May 24, 1989. 
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In its interpretive discussion of required disclosure in the Management, Discussion & 
Analysis section, SEC staff specifically referred to a company’s obligations when iden­
tified as a Potentially Responsible Party (PRP) to a site contamination under CER­
CLA, the “Superfund” law. After a company is so notified, it may be subsequently sub­
ject to the law’s joint and several liability provision for environmental remediation 
costs. The interpretive release states that a PRP notification does not automatically 
require disclosure of an anticipated government proceeding under Item 103 of 
Regulation S-K. However, under Item 303, a PRP notification does require a MD&A 
discussion unless management is able to determine, based on the known facts and 
circumstances, that a material financial effect is not likely to occur. Such circum­
stances might include the company’s contribution to the contamination, its insurance 
coverage, and the likely contribution from other responsible parties. 
Generally Accepted Accounting Standards 
As in Canada, U.S. companies are required to use generally accepted accounting 
practices in preparing and presenting financial statements. Section 4-01a of 
Regulation S-X rules that statements that do not comply with GAAP are considered 
to be misleading. GAAP is defined through authoritative pronouncements by 
accounting standards bodies, such as the Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB). These accounting standards have an important bearing on the way 
companies disclose and treat environmental information. 
Because the Superfund Laws enactment of strict, joint and several liability for 
cleanup of badly contaminated sites created such potentially large financial liabilities 
for many companies, it stimulated considerable attention from the accounting pro­
fession to contingent liabilities arising from environmental contamination. The basic 
accounting framework for dealing with such contingencies is set forth in the FASB 
Financial Accounting Standard No. 5 (“Accounting for Contingencies”) and Financial 
Interpretation No. 14 (“Reasonable Estimation of the Amount of a Loss”). Potential 
liability for costs of environmental cleanup is classified as a contingent liability unless 
the possibility is remote or the costs insignificant. 
FAS5 sets forth two criteria determining whether a contingent liability must be 
accrued. It must be reasonably probable that a loss has occurred, the value of an asset 
has been impaired, or a liability has been incurred. Further, the amount of a loss must 
be reasonably estimated. However, even if no accrual is necessary, the contingency must 
be disclosed if there is a reasonable possibility that a loss has been incurred. In order to 
prevent companies from taking refuge in uncertainties surrounding their share in 
cleanup costs, FIN14 prescribes that if a probable range of loss can be determined, then 
the most likely amount within that range should be accrued. If no amount is more like­
ly than any other, however, the low end of the range should be recorded. FASB’s 
Financial Interpretation No. 93 (FIN93) further prescribed that contingent liabilities 
such as those for environmental remediation should be recorded without netting out 
possible financial recoveries from insurance companies or other responsible parties, 
except under very narrowly defined circumstances. Moreover, FASB’s Emerging Issues 
Task Force, in release EITF 93-5, “Accounting for Environmental Liabilities,” prescribed 
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that such liabilities should not be discounted to their present value unless the amount 
and timing of the outlays can be reliably determined. 
The SEC issued Staff Accounting Bulletin 92 to elaborate on these issues of 
generally accepted accounting practices for contingent liabilities.53 SAB 92 instructs 
registrants that disclosure or accrual should not be delayed because of uncertainty 
until only a single amount can be reasonably estimated. Estimates should be based on 
available information and updated in later filings as more information becomes 
available. SAB 92 confirms that potential recoveries from third parties should not be 
netted against potential liabilities. Rather, the gross amount and the potential 
recovery should be recorded separately in the balance sheet. Further, disclosure 
should be made of the amounts of potential recovery that are contested by third 
parties. If a company does discount an environmental liability, SAB 92 prescribes that 
it must disclose its discounting method and rate, which must not exceed the U.S. 
Treasury bill rate. SAB 92 also articulates the disclosure required in notes to the 
financial statement to make them not misleading, if no amount is accrued. The 
company should disclose the circumstances surrounding the contingency, the range 
of possible outcomes and the company’s judgments and assumptions regarding those 
outcomes. In general, consistent with Regulation S-K, Item 303, the SEC requires that 
disclosure should be sufficient to enable investors to understand the range of 
outcomes that could have a material effect on the company’s liquidity, financial 
condition and results of operation. 
the approach used in this review of mining company
disclosure practices 
This study is an exploratory investigation of the extent to which the disclosures of 
material environmental information by mining companies in the United States and 
Canada have in recent years followed the rules and guidelines summarized above. The 
methodology of the study consists of the following steps: 
First, a number of events were identified that met the following criteria: 1) they 
happened to publicly-traded mining companies listed on U.S. or Canadian stock 
markets; 2) the events had material financial significance for those companies and 
their investors or creditors; 3) the events were related to the companies’ environmen­
tal exposures, performances, obligations, or liabilities; and 4) the events occurred, 
with few exceptions, in the relatively recent past – mostly within the last five years. 
The screen of financial materiality that was used in identifying such events was 
straightforward. Material events included those involving bankruptcies; abrupt and 
large percentage movements in the company’s stock price; denials in operating 
permits to exploit important properties; or increases in financial liabilities and 
obligations that were significant in the context of the company’s overall balance sheet. 
The financial magnitude of the events selected for investigation left little doubt of 
their materiality. 
Second, the financial filings and press releases that the company involved in each 
event made at the time of the event, during subsequent periods and during periods 
53 SEC Release No. 92, 
58FR32843 (June 8, 1993). 
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preceding the event were examined in order to learn what the company had disclosed 
about each of the events selected for investigation. For U.S. companies, this involved 
reviewing 10-K, 10-Q and 8-K forms. For Canadian companies, it involved reviewing 
annual information forms, MD&As, press releases and other periodic and special 
disclosures. 
Third, the background and context of each event was investigated in an effort to 
learn what the company involved knew or was in a position to know about the event 
when and after it happened, and what it was in a position to know about the possi­
bility or likelihood of the event before it occurred. This was the most difficult aspect 
of the exploration because it was carried out with no access to internal company doc­
uments or other material. This phase was carried out by examining reports, studies 
and other material prepared by government agencies, consultants or other experts 
that would have been available to the company and other parties at specific times. 
The purpose of this phase of the investigation was to explore whether the require­
ments of the Management Discussion & Analysis section of the financial reports of 
publicly traded companies – that uncertainties known to management that would 
cause future financial conditions and results to be materially different from those 
reported be disclosed – were being fulfilled. This focus on MD&A reporting was 
motivated by recent reports by securities regulators or accounting standards bodies 
in both the United States and Canada that fulfillment of MD&A reporting obligations 
has generally been unsatisfactory, as well as by the intrinsic importance for investors 
of insight into material forward-looking information. 
In summary, this exploratory investigation is an effort to pursue the line of inquiry 
to which the SEC long ago committed itself but apparently has not pursued: 
“Where a material change in the company’s financial condition or results of 
operations appears in a reporting period and the likelihood of such change was 
not discussed in prior reports, the Commission staff, as part of its review of the 
current filing, will inquire as to the circumstances existing at the time of the 
earlier filings to determine whether the registrant failed to discuss a known 
trend, demand, commitment, event or uncertainty as required by Item 303.”54 
case studies 
Canyon Resources – Kendall Mine 
The Event 
The Kendall gold mine in Lewiston, Montana is owned and operated by Canyon 
Resources, Inc. A reclamation performance bond amounting to $1.86 million had 
been provided by the company in1989. In October, 1999, the Montana Department of 
Environmental Quality, on the basis of a review of the costs of clean-up and remedi­
ation of the cyanide leach pad and other mine works, determined that the bond must 
be increased to $8.3 million. This increase of $6.44 million represented a material 
amount for the company relative to its total and current assets of $81.8 and $13.6 mil­
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lion at the end of 1998. On August 21, 2000, the Montana DEQ further raised the 
required bond amount to $14.2 million. 
The Company’s Disclosures 
In the company’s third quarter 10-Q filing, dated September 30, 1999, it promptly 
disclosed the increased bond amount, stating that the company “had received a 
determination notice from the Department of Environmental Quality for an increase 
in the Kendall Mine reclamation bond from approximately $1.9 million to 
approximately $8.1 million. Although the company believes the increased bond 
amount greatly exceeds the costs of remaining work to be accomplished, it is unsure 
what remedies, if any, the DEQ may seek if the parties cannot agree on the 
appropriate bond amount.”55 
Moreover, next year, in its third quarter 10-Q filing for September 30, 2000, the 
company disclosed  that “In August, 2000, the DEQ further revised the bond amount 
to approximately $14.2 million. The company believes the DEQ bond amount exceeds 
the cost of remaining work and has filed an administrative appeal to the DEQ’s 
actions.”56 Therefore, Canyon Resources discharged its obligation to promptly 
disclose this material information. Furthermore, in subsequent disclosure extending 
from 2000 through the third quarter of 2003, the company discussed its ongoing 
controversy with the state of Montana regarding reclamation at the Kendall Mine, 
including the information that in February, 2002 the DEQ had issued a decision that 
a comprehensive Environmental Impact Statement would be required to guide the 
remaining reclamation, a decision that the company maintained would unnecessarily 
delay work and increase costs. 
Prior to October 1999, Canyon Resources was aware that the adequacy of its 
reclamation bond was under review by the Montana Department of Environmental 
Quality. The Montana Mine Reclamation Act stipulates that the department must carry 
out an overview of the bond amount annually and a comprehensive bond review at 
least every five years. It also provides that the department shall consult with the licensee 
or permittee if the review indicates that the bond should be adjusted. The DEQ notifies 
the company when such a review is undertaken and makes use of data and information 
provided by the company.57 Therefore, the possibility that the required reclamation 
bond might be raised by a material amount was an uncertainty known to management 
prior to the event and was required to be disclosed under Item 303(d). 
The company did disclose this material uncertainty in its 1998 annual 10-K filing, 
dated April 7, 1999. The company’s MD&A stated that  
“The Kendall Mine operates under permits granted by the DEQ. The DEQ 
requires the Company to maintain a $1,869,000 Reclamation Bond to ensure 
appropriate reclamation. The DEQ is currently reviewing the adequacy of 
the bond amount and the Company anticipates that the DEQ will require a 
bond increase, but cannot presently predict the amount of any such increase. 
Additionally, although the DEQ has approved the Company’s plans related 
to recontouring, revegetation, drainage and dewatering, discussions of long­
55 Canyon Resources, Inc. 10-Q 
report, Third Quarter, 
September 30, 1999, note 10, 
Other Contingent Matters, 
p.14-15. 
56 Canyon Resources, Inc., 10-Q 
report, Third Quarter, 
September 20, 2000, notes to 
CFS, Commitments and 
Contingencies, (a) Site 
Restoration Costs, p.11. 
57 Personal communication, 
Warren McCullough, 
Montana DEQ, 1/28/04. 
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58 Canyon Resources, Inc., 10-K, 
1998, filed 4/07/1999; 
Management Discussion & 
Analysis, p. 40. 
term water handling and heap closure methods continue. The Company’s 
estimate to achieve final mine closure may be impacted by the outcome of 
these pending matters.”58 
In view of the disagreement between the company and the DEQ regarding the 
additional reclamation required, it is plausible that the company at that time was 
unable to predict accurately the outcome of the review. However, Item 303(d) requires 
reports to include a range of estimates, when such a range can be reasonably 
estimated. 
In conclusion, in the case of this event, the company, Canyon Resources, did 
promptly disclose material information, as required, and also provided the required 
warning regarding a material uncertainty known to management though it did not 
reveal the possible financial range of that uncertainty. 
Hecla Mining Company – Bunker Hill/ Coeur d’Alene Mining Superfund Site 
Background 
Mining in the Coeur d’Alene basin in Idaho dates from the 1880s. Many companies 
extracted ores of lead, zinc and other metals from the region for more than a century. 
The Bunker Hill lead smelter there began operations in 1917, when few, if any, 
environmental restrictions were in place. It released hundreds of pounds of lead and 
other heavy metals into the atmosphere daily for years. Tailings discharged into the 
river dispersed onto the floodplain. A fire in 1973 crippled air pollution control 
capacity and markedly increased emissions. In 1977 tall stacks were constructed, 
which dispersed atmospheric deposition over a much wider area. The smelting 
operation was shut down in 1982 and in 1983 a 21 square mile area (“the Box”) was put 
onto the Superfund National Priorities List because of the high levels of lead, arsenic, 
cadmium and other toxic residues in soils and evidence of extremely elevated levels 
of lead in children’s blood samples. Remediation in the residential areas of the site 
(“Operable Unit 1”) began in 1989 and included excavating and replacing 
contaminated soil. Wider remedial action elsewhere in the Box (“Operable Unit 2”) 
began on the basis of an EPA Record of Decision in 1992. In August 1994 a consent 
decree was filed involving Hecla and other major surviving mining companies calling 
for cleanup of residential areas at a cost of about $44 million. This work, mostly 
performed by the EPA and the State of Idaho, continued throughout the 1990s and 
beyond at a cost estimated by the General Accounting Office in March 2001 of $212 
million. 
A much larger area in the Coeur d’Alene valley and beyond was polluted both by 
atmospheric deposition and by mine effluents discharged into the Coeur d’Alene 
River, released from holding ponds or washed from mines, tailings and mine wastes. 
The area affected suffered damages to fish and wildlife as well as to the human pop­
ulation, including those on tribal reservation lands. Efforts to deal with this wide­
spread contamination during the early 1990s had had limited effect. 
In February 1998, after consultations with mining companies and state officials, 
EPA made a controversial announcement of the decision to carry out a Remediation 
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Investigation/Feasibility Study under CERCLA, a step leading toward Superfund 
remediation action for the broader area. In June 2000 a federal court decision con­
firmed that the broader area outside the Box was included in the National Priority 
List definition of the Bunker Hill facility. The remedial investigation carried out by 
the EPA included extensive consultations and negotiations with local communities 
and governments, mining companies, and state officials. The draft RI was released for 
public comment in July 2000 and finalized in July 2001. The various remediation 
options described in the study ranged in cost from $194 million in present value, the 
mining companies’ preferred option, to $2.6 billion, the maximum option. On 
September 12, 2002, after months of public comment and discussion, the EPA released 
its Record of Decision for the much larger area outside the Box (“Operable Unit 3”) 
to deal with contaminated soils and water. The total estimated discounted present 
cost of the actions identified in this ROD was approximately $360 million. This cost 
estimate was additional to the amounts of money spent and remaining to be spent on 
remediation within the 21-square mile Box area. 
In March 1996, the U.S. Department of Justice filed suit on behalf of the EPA and 
other federal agencies, alleging that Hecla and other mining companies were liable for 
the payment of response costs and natural resource damages resulting from the 
release of hazardous materials. This suit was consolidated with an earlier suit brought 
in 1991 by the Coeur d’Alene Tribe for recovery of natural resource damages. EPA 
sued to recover costs spent by the federal government on removal and remediation of 
hazardous materials. Other plaintiffs sued for recovery of natural resource damages. 
The suit finally came to a partial decision on September 3, 2003. The district court 
ruled that Hecla was liable for 31% of the damages and response costs. The second 
phase of the trial will settle the extent of damages and liabilities. It will go to trial in 
2004 and a decision is expected in 2005. 
The Events 
Within this history, two events stand out as particularly significant. The first is the 
EPA’s announcement in September 2002 of its Record of Decision for remedial action 
in Operating Unit 3, the larger Coeur d’Alene Basin, with an estimated discounted 
present cost of approximately $360 million. The second is the decision of the federal 
court in September 2003 assigning a 31 percent liability to Hecla for the costs of reme­
dial actions and natural resource damages. Both followed well after the consent 
decree of 1994 in which Hecla assumed partial responsibility for remedial actions 
within Operating Units 1 and 2. Because of the lengthy processes preceding these find­
ings, both decisions represented material uncertainties known to the company well 
prior to the dates of announcements. 
Hecla’s Disclosures 
During this lengthy process Hecla disclosed each of the events described above and 
other related events as they occurred, mostly in the Financial Contingencies segment 
of its annual and quarterly reports. It also disclosed its remedial spending on the 
Bunker Hill and other sites and the liabilities it had accrued for future work at Bunker 
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Hill and other sites. Despite the availability of EPA’s draft RI/FS documents and their 
range of cost estimates, it did not discuss its possible liabilities in the wider basin. For 
example, the following language from the 10-Q issued in May 14, 2001, well after the 
draft feasibility study estimates became available, states: 
“Hecla has not accrued any amounts for potential liability associated with 
the Coeur d’Alene River Basin environmental claims as the amount, if any, is 
currently not estimable. It is reasonably possible that Hecla’s obligation may 
change in the near or longer term. An adverse ruling against Hecla on liabil­
ity and damages in this matter could have a material adverse effect on the 
Company.” (10-Q, 5/14/01) 
However, on August 20, 2001, Hecla made use of the 8-K disclosure form to 
announce the conclusion of its Agreement in Principle with the government on 
August 16, 2001 with respect to those liabilities and elaborated in its next quarterly 
report on August 20th. 
“On August 16, 2001, the Company entered into an Agreement in Principle 
with the United States and the State of Idaho to settle the governments’­
claims for natural resource damages and cleanup costs related to the historic 
mining practices in the Coeur d’Alene Basin in northern Idaho. The settle­
ment, if and when finalized in the form of a Consent Decree, would release 
the Company from further liability to the governments for its historic min­
ing practices in the Coeur d’Alene Basin. The Agreement in Principle caps 
for a period of ten years the majority of the cleanup related expenditures the 
Company is responsible for annually at the Bunker Hill Superfund Site, the 
Grouse Creek Mine and the Stibnite site in central Idaho. The Agreement 
limits these payments to the Government and/or cleanup obligations at these 
sites to a fixed annual cap of $5.0 million for each of the first two years of the 
Agreement and $6.0 million for each of the next eight years. Hecla is com­
mitted to work and/or make payments of $4.0 million annually for the fol­
lowing 20 years thereafter. In addition, Hecla would either have to pay or per­
form clean up obligations amounting to 10% of its operating cash flow as 
adjusted for certain exploration expenditures. Hecla would provide a securi­
ty interest in assets with a value of $20 million, which will decline over ten 
years. The Agreement in Principle does not include the Coeur d’Alene Indian 
Tribe; however, the Company hopes to be able to include the Tribe as a party 
to the settlement under the terms of a final consent decree. Representatives 
of the United States, the State of Idaho and the Company continue to work 
on terms of a definitive consent decree incorporating the terms of the 
Agreement in Principle. However, there are a number of significant issues, 
which will need to be resolved prior to finalizing the definitive Consent 
Decree. As of March 31, 2002, the Company has accrued $42.7 million relat­
ed to the properties covered by the Agreement in Principle. The range of lia­
bility for these sites could be up to $138.0 million on an undiscounted basis 
plus the percentage of operating cash flow.” 
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A year later, in August 2002, the company announced its intention to withdraw 
from the Agreement in Principle, as follows: 
“Since August 2001, the Company and EPA have continued to negotiate a 
final consent decree based upon the terms set forth in the Agreement in 
Principle. Due to a number of changes that have occurred since the signing 
of the Agreement in Principle, including improvements in the environ­
mental conditions at Grouse Creek and lower estimated cleanup costs in the 
Coeur d’Alene Basin as well as the Company’s improved financial condition, 
the terms of the multiple properties settlement approach set forth in the 
Agreement in Principle appear no longer favorable to the Company. It is 
expected that utilizing the Agreement in Principle as a settlement vehicle will 
likely be discontinued. However, Hecla continues to negotiate the terms of a 
settlement with the United States and the State of Idaho that would be 
limited to resolving its environmental cleanup liabilities for historic mining 
practices in the Coeur d’Alene Basin.” 
In its next quarterly report, issued in November, 2002, Hecla did disclose the EPA’s 
Record of Decision with its estimated discounted present cost of $359 million, and the 
ongoing trial of Hecla’s liability for those costs and natural resource damages. Its con­
clusion, however, was as follows: 
“Due to a number of uncertainties related to this matter, including the out­
come of pending litigation and the result of any settlement negotiations, the 
Company does not have the ability to estimate what, if any, liability exists 
related to the Coeur d’Alene River Basin at this time. It is reasonably possi­
ble the Company’s ability to estimate what, if any, obligation relating to the 
Coeur d’Alene Basin may change in the near or long term depending on a 
number of factors. In addition, an adverse ruling against the Company for 
liability and damages in this matter could have a material adverse effect on 
Hecla.” 
When the district court issued its ruling that Hecla’s liability for contamination of 
the Coeur d’Alene Basin amounted to 31 percent of damages and response costs, 
Hecla disclosed this event in its next quarterly report, on November 14, 2003: 
“On September 3, 2003, the Court issued its Phase I ruling, holding that we 
have some liability for Coeur d’Alene Basin environmental conditions. The 
Court refused to hold the defendants jointly and severally liable for historic 
tailings releases and instead allocated a 31% share of liability to us for these 
releases. The natural resource damages to which this 31% applies and the 
Court’s determination of an appropriate cleanup plan will be addressed in 
the Phase II trial. The Court also found that while certain Basin natural 
resources had been injured, the Court stated that ‘there has been an exagger­
ated overstatement’ by the plaintiffs of Basin environmental conditions and 
the mining impact. The Court also significantly limited the scope of the 
trustee plaintiffs’ resource trusteeship and will require proof in the Phase II 
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trial of the trustees’ percentage of trusteeship in co-managed resources. The 
Court also left for the Phase II trial issues on the deference, if any, to be 
afforded the government’s cleanup plan and on defendants’ constitutional 
due process/retroactivity defense. The Phase II trial is scheduled to com­
mence on January 18, 2005. . . . Although the U.S. Government has previous­
ly issued its Record of Decision proposing a cleanup plan totaling approxi­
mately $359 million, based upon the Court’s prior orders, including its 
September 3, 2003 order and other factors and issues to be addressed by the 
Court in the Phase II trial, we estimated the range of our potential liability 
in the Basin to be $18.0 million to $58.0 million, with no amount in the range 
being more likely than any other number at this time. Based upon generally 
accepted accounting principles (GAAP), we accrued the minimum liability 
within the range. As of September 30, 2003, we have estimated and accrued 
a potential liability for claims in the Coeur d’Alene Basin litigation of $18.0 
million. It is reasonably possible that our ability to estimate what, if any, lia­
bility we may have relating to the Coeur d’Alene Basin may change in the 
future depending on a number of factors, including the outcome of the 
Phase II trial.” 
Disclosure Issues 
Although Hecla has disclosed material events related to the Coeur d’Alene/Bunker 
Hill Superfund site promptly as they have occurred and has warned investors that 
these events may have material adverse effects on the company, as the excerpts from 
their financial filings quoted above indicate, three disclosure issues related to these 
events appear to be significant. 
First, in the light of the court’s assignment of a 31 percent liability to Hecla, the 
EPA’s Record of Decision with respect to clean-up costs in the wider basin (Operating 
Unit 3) and the estimated costs of cleaning up the Bunker Hill “Box” (Operating 
Units 1 and 2), it does not seem plausible that a potential liability to the company of 
$18 million is as likely as any other figure, or that the range of $18 to $58 million cap­
tures the company’s potential liability. The following considerations lead toward a 
significantly higher range of outcomes. Taken in combination, they raise a serious 
question whether the company has accurately estimated its liability. 
●	 Within Operating Units 1 and 2, the total expenditures for response and 
remediation have been estimated to total in the vicinity of $212 million, 
according to a study by the General Accounting Office. The larger part of 
those costs was borne by state and federal agencies and is included in the 
amounts the government seeks to recover in part from Hecla. Moreover, 
since most of those expenditures were made prior to September 2003, they 
cannot be discounted into present value terms in estimating a liability. 
●	 The EPA’s Record of Decision estimated a cost for the preferred remedia­
tion option in Operating Unit 3 of $359 million in present costs. This
 
option was chosen from a range with associated discounted present costs
 
of $194 to $2,600 million. Thirty-one percent of the ROD costs amounts
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to $111 million. Since those costs are already expressed in present value 
terms, it would be inappropriate to discount them again. Though the 
company has questioned the plan adopted in the record of decision, it per­
haps should have afforded some weight to the government’s decision. 
●	 Although the trial judge remarked that in his view the claims for natural 
resource damages had been exaggerated by the plaintiffs, which include 
various federal agencies as well as the Coeur d’Alene Tribe, the alleged 
damages were in excess of a billion dollars, based on contamination of 
human, fish, and wildlife habitat in a 1,500 square mile area over a period 
extending decades into the past and decades into the future. It is question­
able whether the most likely outcome is that the damages will be found to 
be negligible. 
Second, according to current regulations, a company is required to explain the 
assumptions underlying its estimates of liability. Hecla has not done this with respect 
to the liability it has accrued for the Coeur d’Alene site. 
Third, over the period from the time that the government decided to initiate a 
Remediation Investigation/Feasibility Study for the Coeur d’Alene basin in 1998 to 
the court’s assignment of substantial liability to Hecla, the sequence of events indi­
cated the company’s increasing financial exposure to the problems in the basin. These 
events included a court’s affirmation that the wider basin could be included in the 
CERCLA action, the release of the EPA’s draft RI/FS report with its range of costs, the 
Record of Decision indicating a discounted present cost of $360 million for the pre­
ferred option, and finally the decision of the first phase of the trial for recovery of 
damages and response costs. As seen through the eyes of management, this increas­
ing financial risk to the company must have been obvious, given the efforts that man­
agement made through negotiation, legal and political actions to limit the company’s 
exposure. Nonetheless, the Management Discussion & Analysis sections of financial 
reports over this period, intended to provide investors with an understanding of the 
risks, prospects, and uncertainties facing the company as seen by management, pro­
vide little such guidance, beyond the indication that unfavorable outcomes could 
have material adverse consequences. 
For example, after the announcement of EPA’s Record of Decision in September 
2002, the MD&A for the next quarterly report, after repeating information regarding 
the abrogation of the Agreement in Principle with the government, went on to say lit­
tle of any value to investors: 
“Due to a number of uncertainties related to this matter, including the out­
come of pending litigation and the result of any settlement negotiations, the 
Company does not have the ability to estimate what, if any liability exists 
related to the Coeur d’Alene River Basin at this time. It is reasonably possi­
ble [that] the Company’s ability to estimate what, if any, obligation relating 
to the Coeur d’Alene Basin may change in the near or long term depending 
on a number of factors. In addition, an adverse ruling against the Company 
for liability and damages in this matter could have a material adverse effect 
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on Hecla. (For additional information, see Note 5 of the Notes to 
Consolidated Financial Statements). Reserves for closure costs, reclamation 
and environmental matters [at all sites] totaled $50.7 million at September 
30, 2002. Hecla anticipates that expenditures relating to these reserves will be 
made over the next several years. Although Hecla believes the reserve is ade­
quate based on current estimates of aggregate costs, Hecla periodically 
reassesses its environmental and reclamation obligations as new information 
is developed. Depending on the results of the reassessment, it is reasonably 
possible that Hecla’s estimate of its obligations may change in the near or 
long term.” 
After the court decision finding Hecla’s liability to be 31 percent of the total was 
announced, the MD&A in the next quarterly report was similarly uninformative and 
not fully consistent with the current status of the issue, since the EPA had already 
issued a Record of Decision and Hecla’s liability had already been established. 
“On January 1, 2003, we adopted SFAS No. 143 ‘Accounting for Asset 
Retirement Obligations’ . . . At our non-operating properties, we accrue costs 
associated with environmental remediation obligations when it is probable 
that such costs will be incurred and they are reasonably estimable. Accruals 
for estimated losses from environmental remediation obligations have 
historically been recognized no later than completion of the remedial 
feasibility study for such facility and are charged to provision for closed 
operation and environmental matters. We periodically review our accrued 
liabilities for remediation costs as evidence becomes available indicating that 
our remediation liabilities have potentially changed. Such costs are based on 
management’s current estimate of amounts expected to be incurred when 
the remediation work is performed within current laws and regulations. 
Recoveries of environmental remediation costs from other parties are 
recorded as assets when their receipt is deemed probable. Future closure, 
reclamation and environment-related expenditures are difficult to estimate 
in many circumstances due to the early stages of investigation, uncertainties 
associated with defining the nature and extent of environmental 
contamination, the uncertainties relating to specific reclamation and 
remediation methods and costs, application and changing of environmental 
laws, regulations and interpretations by regulatory authorities and the 
possible participation of other potentially responsible parties. Reserves for 
closure costs, reclamation and environmental matters totaled $70.3 million 
at September 30, 2003. We anticipate that expenditures relating to these 
reserves will be made over the next thirty years. It is reasonably possible that 
the ultimate cost of remediation could change in the future and that changes 
to these estimates could have a material effect on future operating results as 
new information becomes known.” 
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Teck Cominco – Red Dog Mine 
The Event 
On July 15, 2002, the Kivalina Relocation Planning Committee of the village of 
Kivalina, a small traditional Inuit community living in a remote coastal area of 
Alaska, notified Teck Cominco Alaska, operator of the Red Dog mine, of their 
intention to sue the company under the citizen's suit provisions of the Clean Water 
Act for up to $88 million in penalties for more than 3,000 violations of the Clean 
Water Act at the mine and the associated port facility. The suit charges that the mine 
regularly violates its discharge permits with respect to effluents of cyanide and total 
dissolved solids and also discharges excessive quantities of heavy metals. The case was 
dismissed on the grounds that the plaintiff, not being a “person” or “citizen” under 
the Act’s provisions, lacked standing to sue, but six individual members of the KRPC 
have filed a new suit making similar claims. These individuals are being represented 
in their suit by the Center on Race, Poverty and the Environment, a non­
governmental organization in San Francisco. 
The Background 
The Red Dog Mine is located in the DeLong Mountains of the western Brooks Range, 
approximately 600 miles north of Anchorage and 55 miles inland from the Chuckchi 
Sea. It is the largest zinc mine in the world, producing 1.2 million tons of lead and zinc 
concentrate annually. Lead and zinc are mined and then transported over the DeLong 
Mountain Transportation System (DMTS) (the haul road’s official name), to a port site 
storage facility. The metals are transported year-round, but are stored most of the year 
while the Chuckchi Sea is choked with ice. The mine and the port facility are located 
on land owned by the Northwest Alaska Native Association Regional Corporation 
(NANA) and are operated by Teck Cominco Alaska, a subsidiary of Teck Cominco (a 
Canadian mining company). The Alaska Industrial Development and Export 
Authority (AIDEA) owns the DMTS. Teck Cominco was formed in 2001 through the 
merger of the Teck Corporation and Cominco Ltd., the previous operator of the mine. 
The Red Dog Mine has a history of water quality problems, of which Teck 
Cominco has been well aware. Baseline geologic and engineering studies were done 
in the 1980s that indicated that the mine’s geology would make it susceptible to acid 
mine wastes and drainage. In July 1997, Cominco Alaska settled a federal government 
suit alleging that it had repeatedly violated the Clean Water Act by discharging exces­
sive levels of metals and acidity from its wastewater pit and had over a thousand vio­
lations from 1990 to 1993 at its sanitary sewage facility at the port. In the settlement, 
Cominco paid a $1.7 million fine and agreed to spend more than $3 million on long­
term ongoing monitoring and ecological studies. The company also upgraded its 
water treatment process to deal with zinc and cadmium in the effluents. Ecological 
studies found that the Red Dog Creek immediately downstream of the mine had 
background concentrations of metals sufficiently high that the water was unfit for 
aquatic life, against which background the mine had no additional adverse impacts 
on aquatic communities. 
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However, water quality problems and other environmental problems continued at 
the mine. The two year compliance record available online at EPA’s Office of 
Enforcement and Compliance Assurance shows that Red Dog Mine was non-compli­
ant with provisions of the Clean Water Act in all eight quarterly periods from October 
2001 through September 2003. During this period, concentrations of total dissolved 
solids exceeded permitted levels by 1800 percent in the last quarter of 2001 and 
cyanide concentrations exceeded permitted levels by 100 percent in 2002. In com­
ments on a draft of this case study, the company pointed out that over the period 1998 
to 2003 it was in negotiations with the EPA and the Alaskan government over estab­
lishing a standard for total dissolved solids for the mine three times less stringent than 
the one in force and operated under consent orders until 2003, when this higher limit 
of 1500 ug/L was put into place. The company also pointed out that over the same 
period it was negotiating with EPA and Alaska about the appropriate way of measur­
ing harmful cyanide in the effluent, eventually gaining acceptance of a different 
method that showed cyanide concentrations meeting permitted levels. 
Within this period, in another study written in June 2001 for the Alaska 
Department of Fish and Game Restoration, it was reported that effluents from the 
Red Dog Mine over the period June 27, 1996 to June 27, 1997 had high concentrations 
of sulfate ions (1800-1900 mg/l) as well as high concentrations of calcium ions (590­
665 mg/l) and high concentrations of total dissolved solids (2700-2740 mg/l) and that 
on balance the effluent was highly acidic. Based on a scientific literature review, the 
report stated that toxicity to aquatic organisms depends primarily on ionic proper­
ties and that TDS concentrations in excess of 750 mg/l significantly reduces fertiliza­
tion and hatching in coho and chum salmon. Red Dog’s effluents at the outfall had 
concentrations more than three times as high as that threshold. The company stated 
that it relied on dilution to reduce concentrations to non-toxic levels downstream at 
the point at which salmon could begin spawning. 
Other EPA records also indicate continuing environmental problems. When the 
mining industry began reporting under the Toxic Release Inventory in 1998, the Red 
Dog Mine had the fifth largest toxic releases of all reporting mines. Although the 
company asserts that reportable TRI “releases” consisted of controlled mining wastes 
containing naturally occurring minerals, TRI records show that for the period 1998 
through 2001 releases of reportable toxic substances to air and water, as well as to 
land, all showed rising trends. 
In June 2001 a study carried out for the National Park Service found elevated lev­
els of lead, zinc and cadmium along the road leading from the mine to the port 
through a national park. Shortly thereafter, in September 2001, the Alaska 
Community Action on Toxics released information that monitoring of the port site 
from 1990 to 1996 had found lead concentrations in soils as much as 36 times the State 
of Alaska’s threshold for remediation requirements and more than twice as high as 
the threshold for zinc contamination. The company’s comments state that it has 
taken steps to improve those problem areas. 
In short, Teck Cominco was well aware of its environmental problems at the Red 
Dog Mine and its history of record of permit violations over the decade preceding the 
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suit, because of its mandated monitoring and reporting programs, monitoring by 
outside bodies, and notices of non-compliance by government environmental agen­
cies. It knew that the fact that it was operating under a compliance order did not 
shield it from citizens' suits alleging damages from violations of standards then in 
force. 
Disclosures 
When the lawsuit was announced, Teck Cominco took note of it in its 2002 Annual 
Report’s Environment, Health and Safety Section: 
“A Committee from the community near the Red Dog mine brought pro­
ceedings against Teck Cominco alleging violations of the Clean Water Act 
and the mine’s water discharge permits. The vast majority of the alleged inci­
dents were permitted through compliance orders issued by the EPA and Teck 
Cominco Alaska has worked closely with the regulatory authorities and 
NANA to meet the concerns of the community of Kivalina.” 
Prior to the time that the suit was announced, none of the company’s filings give 
any indication that the water quality or other environmental problems at the Red Dog 
Mine, extending over a period of years, might create a financial risk or exposure. 
Neither the Management Discussion & Analysis nor the Environmental Matters 
sections of the company’s reports treat the issue as a risk or uncertainty known to 
management. The Description of Business section of the company’s 2002 Annual 
Information Form stated 
“All contaminated water from the mine area and waste dumps is collected and 
contained in a tailings impoundment and seasonally discharged through a 
water treatment plant. Mill process water is reclaimed from the tailings pond. 
The mine and associated port facility operate under effluent permits issued by 
the EPA and air permits issued by the state of Alaska. The operation is in 
material compliance with all of its permits or related regulatory instruments 
and has obtained all the permits that are material to its operations.” 
This statement seems to be inconsistent with the information published by EPA’s 
Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance, which stated that Red Dog was 
not in compliance with the Clean Water Act throughout 2002 and early 2003 and was 
guilty of significant non-compliance with the Act’s regulations in the last quarter of 
2001. The company’s explanation is that it was operating under Compliance Orders 
under Consent during this period. A Compliance Order under Consent is an admin­
istrative order issued by the regulatory agency to a permittee stating what the latter 
must do to correct a violation, to which actions the permittee has consented. 
The company’s reports during 2001 and 2002 emphasized the company’s environ­
mental awareness and progress. The 2001 AIF states: “At the date hereof, none of the 
company’s operations are the subject of litigation or administrative proceedings 
relating to environmental matters that could materially affect the business of the 
company.” 
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There is no indication of any impending risk of such events. The MD&A section 
of the 2001 Annual Report announced the company’s freestanding Sustainability 
Report and stated that “overall environmental performance at Red Dog remains on 
par with the best mines in the world.” 
The company’s position is that it had no reason to regard an environmental law 
suit as likely because it took actions to correct water quality problems, its studies did 
not show that its effluents presented health or ecological problems above those 
inherent in background conditions, and that it operated with the concurrence of 
environmental regulatory agencies. Moreover, it holds that the lawsuit was not a 
material event. However, investors may not have agreed: in the five-business-day 
window surrounding the announcement of the forthcoming suit, the company’s 
stock price fell by ten percent. 
Anvil Range Mining Company – The Faro Mine 
The Event 
In 1994, the Anvil Range Mining Company purchased the Faro Mine property in the 
Yukon from a receiver that was handling the assets of Curragh Resources, which went 
bankrupt in 1992. Anvil operated the mine intermittently into 1997. Anvil declared 
bankruptcy in April of 1998,59 although in the fall of 1997 the company had declared 
assets of $162.5 million and liabilities of $93.8 million. At the time that Anvil received 
court protection from creditors, its outstanding debt was over $30 million.60 Anvil 
Range claimed that their bankruptcy was due to low lead and zinc prices. However, 
at that time the Faro Mine faced closure and remediation costs that had been esti­
mated at $124 million in 1993, before Anvil Range purchased the mine, against which 
Anvil held a Reclamation Securities Trust that was funded at the level of $12.5 million. 
Background 
Following Curragh Resources’s abandonment of the Faro properties in 1993, the 
Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development Canada (DIAND) studied 
the cost of closure and cleanup at the site. A 1993 engineer’s report commissioned by 
DIAND estimated that the cleanup of Faro would cost $124 million in discounted 
present value terms.61 At that time Cominco Ltd. also considered acquiring the Faro 
property but judged that the liability could well be in the $125 million range and 
decided not to pursue the acquisition.62 In a letter dated February 22 1994, Richard D. 
Minor of Cominco told the receiver in charge of the Faro properties that Cominco 
had determined a reclamation liability of about $120 million63 and largely for this rea­
son had decided not to purchase the properties.64 Curragh had made a lower estimate 
in the $55 million range on the assumption that mine tailings would be reprocessed, 
an assumption that Cominco dismissed. 
In November 1994, Anvil Range entered an agreement with DIAND to establish a 
Reclamation Security Trust for the Faro property that was capped at $100 million and 
would be funded on a units of production basis, with contributions rising and falling 
with the net price of zinc. By the end of October 1995 the RST had accumulated $9.4 
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million and a year later the fund stood at $11.6 million. In October 1995, Anvil Range 
had also recognized a liability of $43.5 million for environmental remediation on the 
property, having adopted Curragh’s assumptions that reprocessing of tailings and 
lower reclamation standards would bring the costs well below those estimated for 
DIAND two years earlier. 
As the result of this arrangement, in which DIAND had concurred, falling zinc 
prices lowered the company’s contributions to the Reclamation Securities Trust at the 
same time that the reprocessing of tailings became less economical, raising the com­
pany’s reclamation liabilities. The company never made this risk clear as zinc prices 
fluctuated, nor did it disclose a current estimate of the environmental liability in the 
event that reprocessing of tailings proved infeasible. By 1998, when the company 
declared bankruptcy, inflation and the increased volume of waste materials had raised 
the previous estimated cost of $125 million to the $145-150 million range. 
A final reclamation plan for the site has not been completed. However, a report 
from Canada’s Commissioner on Environment and Sustainable Development esti­
mated in 2002 that cleanup at Faro will cost at least $200 million.65 David Sherstone, 
the person directly in charge of the cleanup effort for DIAND, estimates that the 
cleanup will cost between $200 million and $250 million, which he characterized as 
“almost certainly an underestimate.”66 Other estimates range as high as $400 mil­
lion.67 DIAND has already given $40 million to Anvil Range’s interim receiver for 
reclamation at the site; this number is not included in any of the estimates for com­
pleting reclamation.68 
Disclosures 
The company consistently stated in its financial disclosures that it expected the 
amounts accumulating in the RST to be adequate to meet its closure and reclamation 
obligations at Faro. In its 1996 Annual Information Form released in mid-1997, for 
example, it stated 
“While the RST [Reclamation Securities Trust] together with the amounts 
secured by existing security arrangements under the Water Licenses are 
expected to be adequate to fund the closure liabilities of all these properties, 
based on the ICAP [Integrated Comprehensive Abandonment Plan], Anvil 
Range remains liable for such liabilities notwithstanding the existence of the 
RST. Anvil Range’s on-going costs to maintain the mines in environmental 
compliance on the Faro Properties will be funded from operating cash 
”69flow.
In its 1997 Annual Report, the company discussed the situation at Faro as follows: 
“The Water Licenses also contain provisions relating to the reclamation and 
eventual abandonment of the mining and mill sites and require Anvil Range 
to submit plans for conducting those activities in an environmentally safe 
manner for the Water Board’s review. Accordingly, in 1996, the Integrated 
Comprehensive Abandonment Plan (“ICAP”) and the Tailings Reprocessing 
Feasibility Study were filed with the Yukon Territory. The reports describe 
65 Commissioner of the 
Environment and 
Sustainable Development, 
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Environment and 
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Canada. Available: 
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f/html/c20021003ce.html. 
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67 Struzik, Ed. “Abandoned 
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December 21, 2003. 
68 Sherstone (corroborated by 
Struzik). 
69 Anvil Mining Company, 
Annual Information Form, 
1996, released May 30, 1997; 
p. 13-14. 
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Anvil Range’s plans for providing adequate protection to downstream fish­
eries and other natural resources upon mine closure.” 
“Abandonment of the Vangorda and Grum open pits will be undertaken in 
stages when fully depleted. Final abandonment of the Faro Properties will be 
dependent on whether or not Anvil Range locates additional reserves, and 
will be unlikely to occur prior to 2010 although Anvil Range will take certain 
reclamation measures before then. . ..” 
“While Anvil Range generally endorses the technical approach proposed by 
Curragh in dealing with the monitoring, recycling, and reclamation of 
tailings and dumps left behind by it and other predecessor operators at the 
Faro Properties, Anvil Range has made significant modifications to the 
approach to funding the Faro Properties’ environmental liabilities. Anvil 
Range executed as of November 8, 1994 a Reclamation Security Agreement 
(“RSA”) with the Federal Government as represented by the Department of 
Indian Affairs and Northern Development (“DIAND”) relating to 
environmental matters . . . . Pursuant to the RSA, Anvil Range has created a 
Reclamation Security Trust (“RST”), which will fund its environmental 
closure liabilities on the Faro Properties on an ongoing basis. The RST is 
managed by an independent trustee, who obtains independent investment 
counsel for investment decisions. The RST, together with existing security 
arrangements under the Water Licenses, will have a maximum contribution 
limit of $100 million, inclusive of interest, subject to downward adjustment 
for reclamation expenditures made before final mine closure. If after the 
earlier of October 3, 2001 or October 31 of the year in which Anvil Range has 
on a commercial basis commenced reprocessing of tailings (and subject to a 
review every three years thereafter) the estimated closure liabilities related to 
the Faro Properties exceed the then current maximum contribution limit, 
the limit will be increased quarterly thereafter by the amount of the 
Canadian Gross Domestic Product Implicit Price Deflator applied to the 
difference at that time between the balance in the RST and such estimated 
closure liabilities.” 
“The RST will be applicable to the decommissioning and reclamation of 
mining and related activities relating to the historical operations of the Faro 
Properties and to future operations at the Faro Properties. While the RST 
together with the amounts secured by existing security arrangements under 
the Water Licenses are expected to be adequate to fund the closure liabilities 
of all these properties, based on the ICAP, Anvil Range remains liable for 
such liabilities notwithstanding the existence of the RST. Anvil Range’s on­
going costs to maintain the mines in environmental compliance on the Faro 
Properties will be funded from operating cash flow.” 
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“The RST will be funded by a net smelter royalty (“NSR”) which is deter­
mined as a percentage of the net sales proceeds of Anvil Range from sales of 
zinc and lead concentrates derived from the Faro Properties after deducting 
ocean freight, smelter treatment charges and other off-shore charges. The 
royalty calculation applies to all mine revenue but the rate of the NSR will be 
determined on a graduating scale based on prevailing zinc prices commenc­
ing at a zinc price of US $0.50 per pound.” 
Thus, up to the brink of bankruptcy, Anvil Range continued to maintain that it 
had adequately provided for reclamation of the Faro Mine and failed to disclose its 
increasing liability as its strategy for funding the reclamation disintegrated. 
Manhattan Minerals – Tambogrande   
The Event 
Manhattan Minerals Corporation, a Canadian mining company headquartered in 
Vancouver, is devoted to the international exploration and development of mining 
properties, with a heavy strategic emphasis on northern Peru, where its concessions 
at Tambogrande are located. Manhattan Minerals Corporation shares trade on the 
Toronto Stock Exchange. It acquired a concession to develop the Tambogrande 
deposits in 1997 from President Fujimori and began exploratory studies. On June 2, 
2002, the residents of the town where the mine would be located conducted a 
referendum on the question of whether the mine project should go forward. Over 93 
percent of those participating voted “No.” 
Manhattan Minerals’ stock price fell by approximately 30 percent in the following 
days, proving that the results constituted a material event to investors. Moreover, in 
September 2002, the company announced that due to “volatility in equity markets” 
the company was postponing a private placement and re-pricing significantly down­
wards share purchase warrants that it had issued a year earlier. This increased the 
company’s difficulties in demonstrating to the Peruvian government that it had the 
financing to develop the concession property, a question then at issue. In December 
2003, this issue formed the announced basis for the government’s decision that 
Manhattan Minerals had not fulfilled the financial requirements of the project and 
had forfeited its concession rights. Therefore, the referendum was clearly a material 
financial event for the company. 
Background70 
Prospective mining activity in the Tambogrande region dates from 1978, when the 
Peruvian government declared the district of Tambogrande a national reserve in 
which mining development was in the national interest of the country and author­
ized the French company Bureau de Recherches Géologiques et Minières (BRGM) to 
carry out a pre-feasibility study. The government’s efforts to establish a mine in 
Tambogrande in the 1980s failed largely because there was already opposition from 
the local population. 
70 This history draws mainly 
from the report of the 
international observers’ team 
that monitored the 
referendum. See Stephanie 
Rousseau and Francois 
Meloche, “Gold and Land: 
Democratic Development at 
Stake: Report of the 
Observation Mission of the 
Tambogrande Municipal 
Consultation Process in 
Peru,” International Center 
for Human Rights and 
Development, Montreal, 
Canada, 2002. 
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On May 6, 1999, the regime of President Alberto Fujimori published a supreme 
decree allowing Manhattan Minerals Corporation to acquire ten mining concession 
rights covering a territory of 10,000 hectares in Tambogrande, which includes an 
urban area and an area slated for urban expansion. On May 14, 1999, another supreme 
decree incorporated the Tambogrande mining project, formed of Manhattan 
Minerals Corporation and Minero Perú, a government corporation. Manhattan 
Minerals Corporation purchased the concession rights and preliminary studies from 
BRGM and the government granted Manhattan Minerals exploration rights over 
10,000 hectares for a period of four years as of May 6, 1999. 
The May 1999 agreement between the government and Manhattan Minerals stip­
ulated that a new company, Empresa Minera Tambogrande, be created to operate the 
mine. Manhattan Minerals would own 75 percent of the company and the other 25 
percent would be owned by Minero Perú, a state-owned company. The agreement 
also stipulated that Manhattan Minerals, alone or with a partner, must hold assets of 
US$100 million and that the average processing capacity of the mine be 10,000 tons 
of rock per day, using methods and technologies that would not affect the infrastruc­
ture of the town of Tambogrande or harm the population or cause damage to the sur­
rounding agricultural areas. 
The Tambogrande district, with a population of approximately 70,000, is in the 
Department of Piura, where commercial agriculture has become the main economic 
activity, largely because of an internationally financed irrigation project. Limes, man-
gos, rice, carob, and other foodstuffs for domestic consumption and for export are 
produced there, generating hundreds of millions of dollars in annual sales. The town 
of Tambogrande, under which are located the main deposits, has a population of 
about 16,000. 
Manhattan Minerals undertook geophysical studies in 1997 and carried out 
exploratory drilling during the summer of 1999, confirming the existence of signifi­
cant gold and silver deposits under part of the town of Tambogrande. In addition, 
other deposits were discovered one kilometer and thirteen kilometers south of 
Tambogrande. In 1999, when exploratory drilling in the urban area began, the oppo­
sition to mining that had existed for years began to mobilize again and grew signifi­
cantly, much of it under the leadership of the Tambogrande Defense Front, an organ­
ization composed of delegates elected by consensus in the ten zones of the 
Tambogrande district and delegates from the urban area. The leaders of the Front are 
elected annually and the president is elected in a general public meeting of the entire 
population. 
The “Tambogrande” project, as presented by Manhattan Minerals Corporation, 
contained the following: a 250 meter deep open-pit mine affecting a total area of 750 
hectares within the present boundaries of the town, requiring the relocation of 
approximately 8000 residents and the purchase of 540 hectares of agricultural land; 
the diversion of the Piura River; an ore processing plant; a mine tailings pond and 
other facilities. The mine in Tambogrande has a projected life span of approximately 
10 years, exclusive of closure, remediation, and long-term monitoring. 
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As required by law, an environmental impact assessment study was prepared by an 
international consulting firm hired by the company, to be submitted by Manhattan 
Minerals Corporation to the Peruvian government. According to the company’s 
directors, the study would respect the environmental and social standards established 
by the World Bank’s Multilateral Investments Guarantee Agency (MIGA), including 
standards for relocation and compensation. 
During the period from 1997 through the date of the referendum, Manhattan 
Minerals carried out extensive discussions, meetings and consultations with local 
government officials and residents. The company disseminated information about 
the project and also built model homes to show what relocation of townspeople 
would bring. Nonetheless, opposition within the community and from groups out­
side the community continued. 
One of the central issues for opponents in Tambogrande concerned the powers the 
local population possessed to participate in the decision on the granting of mining 
concessions in an area that is privately owned, inhabited, and under cultivation. 
Consultation with the provincial and the district municipality was a legal prerequi­
site that was not met before the central government granted concessions. 
Despite the company’s assurances, opponents also feared risks to and long-term 
degradation of water resources and the environment. A preliminary EIA of the 
Tambogrande project made public by Manhattan Minerals Corporation in July 2000 
was evaluated by geologist Robert Moran in May 2001. Mr. Moran reported several 
inadequacies in the preliminary study. He also argued that the proposed mine could 
cause a drop in levels of the surface and underground water necessary for agriculture, 
contaminate ground water because of acid runoff from the mine and risk ecological 
disaster related to El Niño, which generates torrential rains in the region every three 
or four years. He recommended that adequate environmental studies be carried out 
by consultants independent of and not hired by the company. 
During the same period, the Front held many meetings with company representa­
tives, including one with the then president, Mr. Graham Clow, on June 12, 2000. At 
this meeting, a document was signed in which the company recognized the Front as 
a “natural and legitimate representative,” and committed itself to “respecting the deci­
sions of the population that result from the process of dialogue that should continue 
from this time onward.” 
At the beginning of 2001, because of the concerns of a large number of his fellow 
citizens, the mayor, who had granted the permit for exploratory activity within the 
town, changed his position and gathered the signatures of approximately 28,000 
citizens (75 percent of voters) of Tambogrande demanding the termination of 
activities related to mining in the region and the withdrawal of Manhattan Minerals 
Corporation This petition was presented to the Peruvian Congress and several public 
institutions, but did not receive any response. 
On February 16, 2001, the municipal council resolved to respect the will of the 
residents to oppose the government's wish to grant authorization to the mining 
project in the district of Tambogrande. A few days later, on February 27 and 28, 2001, 
thousands of Tambogrande residents took part in a demonstration organized by the 
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71 “Mining a Sour Vein in Peru.” 
The Economist. June 23, 2001. 
Front to demand that Manhattan Minerals leave the region. In the urban area of the 
district, the demonstration degenerated into a confrontation with the 300 police 
officers posted to protect the company’s facilities. Fifteen demonstrators and 25 police 
officers were injured and many demonstrators were arrested. Afterward, during the 
night, unidentified individuals burned down the model homes constructed by 
Manhattan Minerals, vandalized the offices of the company and one of its 
subcontractors and destroyed equipment and material. 
On March 16, 2001, one month after the resolution of the municipal council had 
been passed and two weeks after the violent events, the mayor of Tambogrande 
signed a decree rescinding the earlier decree authorizing Manhattan Minerals to carry 
out exploratory drilling within the urban and urban expansion zones. The assassina­
tion of a community leader, Godofredo García Baca, on March 31, 2001, increased the 
climate of tension and distrust on the part of Tambogrande inhabitants. Mr. García 
Baca had spoken out against the mining project many times during public assemblies 
and in meetings with representatives of the mining company. 
Both the mayor of Tambogrande and the leaders of the Defense Front assert that 
they initiated the idea of holding a municipal referendum on mining development in 
their region in order to find a mechanism by which the very strong opposition of a 
good portion of the population could be expressed peacefully. On June 23, 2001, The 
Economist reported that Carlos Herrera, Peru’s energy minister, stated that if the cit­
izens of Tambogrande didn’t want the mine to go ahead, it wouldn’t, even though 
there was nothing legally binding about the citizens’ feelings.71 A municipal order of 
October 11, 2001, created the consulta vecinal as a mechanism for citizen participation 
in the district of Tambogrande, using for justification
●	 The municipal organic law, which establishes the responsibility of the
 
municipal authority in development planning and the competency of the
 
municipal authority to promote and define the mechanisms of public par­
ticipation in community development;
 
●	 The law establishing rights of participation and control by citizens, which
 
provides for the mechanisms of citizen participation at the municipal
 
level, without defining those mechanisms.
 
The municipal council resolution of October 11, 2001, stated that citizens were to 
respond, negatively or affirmatively, by secret ballot, to the following question: “Do 
you agree with the development of mining activities in the urban, urban expansion, 
agricultural, and agricultural expansion zones in the district of Tambogrande?” 
The resolution also called on the Peruvian national electoral agency to organize the 
municipal referendum. However, the national government clearly opposed the refer­
endum process, stating that it was not a legal mechanism provided for under the 
applicable legislative framework for approval or rejection of a mining project and 
that decisions should await the completion of the environmental and social impact 
assessment. 
Nonetheless, the community continued to organize the referendum. The electoral 
regulations allowed for the constitution of two groups to promote the two options 
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citizens were to vote on, the YES option and the NO option. The NO campaign was 
primarily organized by the Defense Front, with the support of member organizations 
from the Technical Committee, including the financial support of Oxfam UK. The 
mining company declined to campaign for the YES side on the grounds that the 
public did not yet have the information contained in the EIA and so could be 
manipulated by political or ideological interests instead of making a decision on the 
basis of technical information. The company representatives also maintained that the 
consultation had no legal validity and that a NO majority would not lead to the 
project’s termination. 
In the voting, out of a total population of 36,937 registered voters, 27,015 ballots 
were issued, a participation rate of 73.14 percent. The NO side won with 25,381 votes, 
or 93.95 percent of the vote, taking into account spoiled or blank ballots. Counting 
only the ballots for the YES and the NO side, the NO side won with 98.65 percent. 
In reaction, the Peruvian government repeated that submission of the EIA fol­
lowed by public hearings were the legal steps toward a decision concerning the future 
of the Manhattan Sechura project in Tambogrande. The Minister of Energy and 
Mines repeated that the municipal consultation had no legal validity. However, the 
Deputy Minister of Mines acknowledged that the result of the vote revealed such 
massive opposition to mining activity that the government could not ignore it. 
Disclosures 
Throughout 2001 and 2002, the company’s press releases and financial reports dis­
cussed its consultations with the community and progress in carrying out the 
Environmental Impact Assessment. However, the first mention of the referendum 
came in a press release dated February 14, 2002, in which the company declared 
“On February 10, 2002 the Ministry of Energy and Mines published in the 
official gazette its resolution to enforce existing laws in Peru that prevents 
local municipalities from calling referendums on issues which conflict with 
National laws. Specifically, the Government of Peru has now publicly stated 
their legal findings that a referendum on mining in the District of 
Tambogrande is not legal and that the Government will enforce the existing 
laws against such a referendum through the National Prosecutor if 
necessary.” 
No indication was given in that release that the popular referendum constituted a 
material risk to the company’s project or plans or a risk to investors. 
The referendum was not mentioned again in company disclosures until June 2002, 
when the company issued a lengthy press release discussing the referendum. 
Although the discussion of the referendum is in the future tense, the press release 
itself is dated June 2, 2002, the date on which the voting took place. This press release 
did not indicate the results of the voting nor the criticisms in Moran’s review of the 
mining studies. Also, many of the events leading up to the referendum, now recited 
as background information, had not been previously disclosed by the company. 
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“On June 2, 2002 the residents of the District of Tambogrande will be asked 
to participate in an opinion poll on mining development in their communi­
ty. The results of this opinion poll are not binding on any of the participants 
or parties involved in the process. It is expected the results of the poll will be 
used as part of a larger public relations campaign being fashioned to dis­
courage industrial development in Peru rather than as a constructive expres­
sion of social interest in a local development project. The ‘consulta popular’ 
or opinion poll being called for June 2, 2002, has been commissioned by 
OXFAM United Kingdom and is scheduled to occur two days prior to a 
nationwide anti-industrial development campaign being funded by, and 
incorporating, a wide number of national and international NGOs, includ­
ing the National Committee Coordinator of Communities Affected by 
Mining (CONACAMI).” 
“Manhattan’s position has been, and continues to be, that the company must 
gain a social license to operate and receive a positive consensus from the pop­
ulation impacted by the project before constructing a mine. But the June 2nd 
opinion poll has no validity on a social license to operate. It is impossible for 
those most impacted by the project to provide an informed opinion about 
the viability, benefits, and risks of a project, without being able to review the 
independent technical, economic, and social issues that are researched in the 
Feasibility Study and Environmental Impact Assessment. The timing of this 
opinion poll puzzles us in that it is scheduled a few weeks prior to the release 
of the company’s Feasibility Study and Environmental Impact Assessment.” 
“What’s more, the June 2nd, 2002 opinion poll commissioned by OXFAM 
United Kingdom runs counter to recommendations made in the August 15, 
2002 OXFAM America-funded report, An Alternative Look at a Proposed 
Mine In Tambogrande, Peru published by Robert Moran of the Mineral 
Policy Center, and Environmental Mining Council. In his report, Moran 
concurs with Manhattan’s position that informed decisions about develop­
ment cannot be made until all of the independently researched information 
is available to community members.” 
“As a first step, Manhattan Minerals must provide a full impact assessment, 
including a comprehensive and final baseline study, and should provide 
community leaders with resources to conduct their own independent assess­
ment of Manhattan’s conclusions. It is only on this basis that those affected 
can make an informed decision about whether or not they wish to accept the 
likely impacts of this mine on their environment, livelihoods and communi­
ty, in exchange for the potential economic benefits of a large scale mining 
operation.” 
“This supports Manhattan’s views regarding informed decisions.” 
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“Since there are no reputable independent public relations firms, Peruvian 
NGOs or government agencies involved in the opinion polling—The 
Defensoria del Pueblo, the Officina Nacional del Proccesos Electorales, the 
Jurado National de Elecciones, and Transparencia have all declined to par­
ticipate—and OXFAM is not heeding its own advice, Manhattan believes the 
results of the opinion poll have no validity.” 
“The following provides background on the June 2, 2002 opinion poll being 
conducted in the District of Tambogrande. 
Background 
●	 On October 11, 2001, the Town Council of the District of Tambogrande, 
Peru passed Ordinance No O12-2001-MDT-C, creating a mechanism for 
citizen’s participation. On the same day the Council passed Resolution 
020-2001-MDT-CM which enabled the council to develop a neighbor­
hood opinion poll regarding mining activity in the District.
● Concurrent to the Town Council’s resolutions the Defensoria del Pueblo 
(Peruvian Ombudsman Organization) was organizing a Table of 
Dialogue for the stakeholders of the Tambogrande mining project. The 
first meeting, including the Mayor of Tambogrande, was held on October 
21, 2001 and the Mayor confirmed the opinion poll (Consulta Popular) 
would not be held in view of the progress being made in organizing the 
dialogue process. In particular the participation of the Defensoria del 
Pueblo. 
● On November 24th, 2001, the Defense Front of Tambogrande withdrew 
from the Dialogue process, claiming the Defensoria del Pueblo, the 
Minister of Energy and Mines, and the Minister of Agriculture were 
biased. 
● The Mayor and town council of Tambogrande subsequently approached 
the National Office of Electoral Processes (ONPE) to organize a Consulta 
Popular to gauge community support for the project and make the 
majority’s opinion legally binding. 
● On January 17th, 2002, ONPE issued Resolution 020-2002-J/ONPE (pub­
lished January 19th, 2002), and on March 22nd, 2002 ONPE issued 
Resolution 098-2002-J/ONPE (published April 26th, 2002) in which it 
stated “the popular consultation referred under Municipal Decision 012­
2001-MDT-C and Council Agreement 020-2001-MDT-CM, both dated 
October 11, 2001, issued by the Tambogrande District Municipality, are 
not binding, and consequently do not obligate ONPE to organize, plan 
and execute said consultation.” 
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● On February 9th, 2002 the Peruvian Government, Ministry of Energy and 
Mines agreed and published Resolution 066-2002-EM/DM indicating 
any Consulta Popular in the Tambogrande Municipality would have no 
legal or binding basis. 
● On February 14th, 2002, in Piura, Peru, Julio Bonelli, General Director on 
Environmental Affairs from the Ministry of Energy and Mines, and 
Matias Prieto Celo, Chief of INRENA held a press conference confirming 
the non legally binding consulta popular, and introduced an accepted 
formal public process of consultation for reviews of industrial develop­
ment. At this same press conference they confirmed that an independent 
team would monitor Manhattan’s Environmental Impact Assessment. 
● On April 20, 2002, the Mayor of the District of Tambogrande issued 
Decree 003-2002-MDT-A calling for a neighborhood opinion poll for 
Sunday, June 2, 2002—just weeks prior to the completion of the 
independently monitored Environmental Impact Assessment. The Mayor 
also appointed Fredy Martin Giraldo Rivera as technical council for the 
opinion poll. 
●	 As of May 10th, 2002 the Office of the Electoral Processes (ONPE) with­
drew all of its advisory and logistical support for the Tambogrande 
Municipality. On May 11th, after the complete withdrawal of the Peruvian 
Office of Electoral Processes the Mayor of Tambogrande proceeded to 
present the committee and advisor for what now constitutes a public 
opinion poll.” 
On the following day, June 3, 2002, the CEO of Manhattan Minerals issued a pub­
lic statement providing the results of the voting but again dismissed them as politi­
cally motivated and non-binding. In this statement, he also revealed that in the pre­
vious year’s protests the company’s office in Tambogrande had been destroyed. 
Subsequent statements, such as a press release dated August 29, 2002, were generally 
optimistic: 
“Just after the quarter ended the second informal meeting was held with 
Peruvian government regulatory agencies to discuss aspects of the EIS. The 
informal information session was well received by authorities and 
Manhattan does not expect the Tambogrande EIS review process to differ 
from the normal EIS review process, except for the request for additional 
public audiences. Manhattan welcomes the additional public audiences, and 
plans to utilize these interactions to gain the necessary community accept­
ance and to obtain a mine development permit.” 
In summary, the strong local opposition to Manhattan Mineral’s project in 
Tambogrande, which was the company’s principal asset, culminating in an over­
whelmingly negative vote in the community referendum in June 2002, was a materi­
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al risk and a known uncertainty in the months leading up to the voting. The over­
whelmingly negative vote in that event resulted in a significant loss to shareholders 
and contributed to the challenge facing the company in attracting the capital needed 
to meet the financial conditions in its concession agreement. The company’s disclo­
sures in the months prior to the referendum did not disclose this risk adequately to 
investors. 
Cambior – The Omai Mine 
The Event 
Overnight between August 19 and 20, 1995, the tailings dam failed at the Omai mine 
in Guyana, releasing approximately 4 million cubic meters of cyanide-laden mine 
waste into the Omai river, which feeds into the Essequibo, which eventually runs 
through the capital. Eighty kilometers of the Essequibo River were contaminated, ani­
mal and aquatic life suffered, and a large percentage of the local residents reported 
negative health effects.72 Cambior, a Canadian company, owned 65 percent of Omai 
Gold Mines Ltd., the operating company, Golden Star owned 30 percent and a 
Guyana government corporation owned the remaining 5 percent. 
Material Financial Effects on the Corporation 
Cambior’s stock plummeted 23 percent between Friday, August 18, 1995 and Monday, 
August 21, 1995. Trading volume went from about 27,000 on the 18th to about 3.7 mil­
lion on the 21st. Golden Star Resources, the minority owner, experienced a similarly 
sharp decline in its stock value.73 Moreover, the dam remained closed for months 
while the failure was investigated and a new tailings impoundment was constructed, 
resulting in substantial loss of income and additional costs for the company. 
Therefore, the dam failure and spill was clearly a financially material event. 
The financial consequences did not stop there, however. In 1999, Guyanese citizens 
tried to sue Cambior for $100 million in damages in Canadian courts. The suit was 
dismissed in 1997 on the grounds that the Guyanese did not have standing to sue in 
Canada. Another class action lawsuit was filed in May of 2003 on behalf of 23,000 
Guyanese, claiming $1 billion in damages against Cambior. Cambior has refused to 
settle, claiming that there is no merit to the suit’s claims.74 
The Background 
The tailings dam spanned the valley of the Omai River and was designed to rise in 
stages to a height of 534 meters. Construction began in 1991. A diversion conduit was 
constructed to carry the river waters through the dam. The dam crest was at 534 
meters and the water level was at 529.6 meters at the time of failure, less than 5 meters 
below the top of the dam. Virtually all of the impounded water was lost when the dam 
failed. 
The subsequent investigations provided considerable information about the 
reasons for the event. The Process Review Committee, appointed by the Guyana 
Geology and Mines Committee to advise on plans for the mine’s reopening and waste 
72 Mineral Resources Forum. 
73 All stock information obtained 
from Big Charts. Available: 
http://bigcharts.marketwatch. 
com/symbollookup/symbolloo 
kupresults.asp?symb=cambior 
&country=all&type=stock. 
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management, stated in its November 1995 report that, at the time of the failure, the 
amount of fluid in storage was eight times larger than the amount specified in the 
project’s 1991 Environmental Impact Statement, which was the only operating plan in 
existence for the Omai Mine project. In fact, the EIS specified a maximum of 0.5 
million cubic feet, about one-eighth the amount of liquid released when the dam 
failed.75 
There were two significant reasons why so much water was being stored behind the 
dam. One was that in Guyana’s tropical climate, heavy annual precipitation in the 
watershed created a positive water balance in the impoundment, requiring that liq­
uids be released periodically from the dam. The second reason, however, was that 
prior to the spill the cyanide content of the liquid in storage was too high for it to be 
released into the river. The company anticipated that natural degradation would 
reduce the cyanide content of the liquid in storage, obviating the need for additional 
treatment with hydrogen peroxide, which they opposed.76 However, in May 1995, 
Cambior applied to the government of Guyana for a modification of its 
Environmental Impact Statement allowing release of water with a cyanide content of 
8 ppm, four times higher than that prescribed in its 1991 EIS. “This request was moti­
vated primarily by the fact that the company was reluctant to raise further the level 
of the dam . . . even  though water levels would have exceeded the maximum permis­
sible by June 1995.”77 This request was denied, so the volume of water in storage con­
tinued to increase, raising pressure at the upstream dam face and reducing the 
amount of freeboard at the dam’s summit below that prescribed in the 
Environmental Impact Statement. 
In addition, according to the report78 of the Dam Review Team to the Guyana 
Geology and Mines Committee, appointed to study the dam failure, the failure 
resulted from flaws in the dam’s design and construction. The dam construction 
consisted of: 
●	 “a sloping core constructed of low-permeability, clayey saprolite79 soils. 
The purpose of the core is to limit and control seepage through the dam. 
●	 a thin zone of coarse-rock “riprap” along the upstream side of the core to 
protect it from wave and rainfall erosion. 
●	 a primary zone of compacted rock fill that comprises the main structural 
body of the dam. 
●	 a thin zone of filter sand whose intent is to prevent fine soil particles in 
the core fill from migrating into and through the voids between the coarse 
rock fill fragments under the influence of dam seepage.” 
The Dam Review Team considered several reasons why other tailings dams had 
failed, including seismic activity, floods, mine subsidence and other natural events. 
All were ruled out. Instead, the Team pointed to flaws in the dam itself: 
“It is our current judgment that failure of the dam was caused by massive 
loss of core integrity resulting from internal erosion of the dam fill, a process 
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also known as piping. This means simply that finer particles from one soil 
moved freely under the influence of seepage forces into and through the 
interstitial voids of adjacent coarser soil due to excessive disparity between 
particle sizes of the two soils.” 
“We believe this process began at the interface between the filter sand and the 
compacted rock fill. Loss of filter sand into the rock fill left the overlying 
saprolite core material unsupported and subject to the development of cavi­
ties, softened zones, and cracks as its particles too moved into the rock fill. 
Cavity development in the core fill is likely to have propagated undetected 
for some period of time until reaching the reservoir at and above the slimes 
level. The final breakthrough of these cavities formed “pipes,” or tunnels, in 
the core fill at multiple locations that allowed uncontrolled flow of water into 
and then longitudinally through the rock fill zone of the dam. These features 
are now manifested by sinkholes on the upstream slope of the dam, as core 
fill and riprap have subsided into the open voids.” 
“There are believed to be two primary physical defects in the dam that 
allowed this process to occur, one related to filter incompatibility between 
the sand and rock fill zones, and another involving the diversion conduit. 
Both were produced by known or suspected deficiencies in design, con­
struction, or construction inspection, either singularly or in combination. 
[Emphasis added.] Moreover, defects related to filter incompatibility and the 
diversion conduit may not be mutually exclusive, and may have interacted in 
complementary ways not yet fully understood.” 
“Internal erosion between zones of adjacent soils is prevented by controlling 
their particle size distributions (or gradations) according to filter design cri­
teria developed over 50 years ago and little changed since then. These filter 
criteria were applied in the dam design, which limited the gradation of the 
rock fill directly adjacent to the filter sand. Current design practice also rec­
ognizes that coarse material is prone to particle-size segregation during con­
struction that has often allowed internal erosion to occur even when other 
filter design criteria have been satisfied. According to supplemental criteria 
that address this problem, the transition zone rock fill should not have 
exceeded a maximum specified particle size of about 25-50mm, whereas the 
design allows for fragments as large as 600mm. Therefore, the transition 
zone rock fill as specified would have been highly susceptible to particle size 
segregation and consequent filter incompatibility.” 
“These design deficiencies notwithstanding, it is apparent that the transition 
zone rock fill was never included in the dam during construction in any 
complete or systematic way. Even if properly designed, meticulous adherence 
to transition rock fill gradation specifications at each and every location 
within the dam would have been mandatory to ensure its safety against 
internal erosion. By contrast, construction documentation and existing 
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conditions on the dam crest indicate that pit-run rock fill of essentially 
unrestricted gradation was placed directly against the filter sand, without 
adequate construction control of this critical feature.” [Emphasis added.] 
“Rock fill placement was supervised during construction of the initial stages 
of the dam and is believed to have been inspected or observed by several geo­
technical engineers on various occasions. Such gross disparity of particle sizes 
between the filter sand and adjacent rock fill as can be currently seen on the 
dam crest should have been visually evident to any experienced geo-technical 
engineer, along with equally clear implications for filter incompatibility 
between the two materials. However, we have been provided with no 
information to indicate that any such supervision, inspection, or observation 
sufficiently recognized the severity of this condition, adequately warned of its 
potential consequences, or undertook measures necessary to correct it.” 
“In basic terms then, the rock fill adjacent to the filter sand was simply too 
coarse to prevent the sand from washing into and through it, and both 
potential and actual problems this produced appear to have gone unrecog­
nized or uncorrected throughout the sequence of design and construction 
until the failure occurred.” 
The Dam Review Committee thus found that the failure was caused primarily by 
faulty design and construction that went unrecognized or uncorrected. Evidence 
from other sources, discussed below, indicates that the problems were not unknown 
but remained uncorrected. 
With respect to the conduit carrying water through the dam, the Review Team 
found that: 
“The pattern, nature, and distribution of surficial damage provide circum­
stantial evidence to suggest that the corrugated steel diversion conduit was 
associated with internal erosion processes. Furthermore, problems related to 
conduits in general have been responsible for a significant proportion of 
earth dam and tailings dam failures, and in particular the use of unencased 
corrugated metal culverts through dam cores is considered bad practice.” 
“Since the remaining slimes behind the dam and saturation levels within it 
are likely to preclude any excavation or direct inspection of the conduit, 
actual damage it may have experienced or produced may never be complete­
ly known. “Additionally, design details for the conduit were not only ambigu­
ous from the start but also underwent continuing change from the feasibili­
ty design continuing on throughout construction, making it difficult for us 
to fully assess the intent of the design or the actual as-built conditions. One 
largely unexplained aspect is that the evolution of conduit design and con­
struction appears to have progressed in several important respects from 
more conservative to less conservative over time, resulting in a number of 
irregularities. It is known that the corrugated steel culvert was crushed by 
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heavy equipment and repaired at two separate locations and occasions dur­
ing construction, suggesting the possibility that other latent damage might 
have gone unrecognized.” 
“The nature of corrugated metal culverts is such that they must deform 
(from circular to slightly oval shape) in order to develop load-carrying 
capacity. This raises the possibility that deformation incompatibility between 
the rigid grouted section and the deformable open section may have caused 
structural failure, or that the combined fill, slimes, and water loads may sim­
ply have exceeded the structural capacity of the culvert in the critical region 
beneath the Stage 1A starter dyke. Any such structural failure would have 
produced a void or allowed soil to enter the conduit, providing a direct path 
for concentrated seepage and cavity formation within the fill.” 
“Even so, structural failure of the conduit would not necessarily have been 
required for concentrated seepage and internal erosion to initiate and prop­
agate along the outer surface of the conduit, a common occurrence without 
adequate safeguards. The details of conduit backfilling and as-built con­
struction are important in assessing this mechanism, and our ongoing inves­
tigation is continuing to evaluate it. There is evidence to indicate that sand 
was used for culvert backfill beneath some portion of the Stage 1A starter 
dyke. Concentrated seepage within this sand may have produced internal 
erosion at its downstream terminus with the rock fill as a result of filter 
incompatibility issues previously discussed . . . .” 
The conclusion of the Dam Review Team indicates that the operating company 
knew or should have known of the risks of dam failure: 
“In this regard, our investigation to date provides no reason to believe that 
the failure was related to any concealed geologic conditions or features, or to 
any anomalous behavior or engineering properties of the dam, foundation 
or fill soils, that would pertain to other structures at the mine site. The failure 
was caused not by some ‘hidden flaw’ but by inadequate application and 
execution of sound practices for design, construction, supervision, and 
inspection that are well understood in current embankment dam and 
tailings dam technology.” (Emphasis added.) 
Were the flaws in the dam known to the company as the water levels rose, or 
should the company have known about them? The Commission of Enquiry quoted 
from faxes between the resident engineer supervising the company’s employees con­
structing the dam and the engineering firm’s head office in September 1992, when the 
first stage of the dam was under construction. The resident engineer pointed out that 
with respect to the grades of rock fill adjacent to the filter sand, “It is fairly certain that 
the selected run of mine waste will not satisfy this specification. Is there room for 
coarsening the specification?” The reply came back: “. . . basically we will accept the 
finest of the run of mine muck which should be fairly close to spec (i.e., some coars­
ening of spec is acceptable.)”80 
80 Report of the Commission of 
Inquiry, p.40. 
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With respect to the diversion culvert, the Commission of Inquiry cited an 
exchange of letters between the project engineer and the home office: 
“Further to our discussion yesterday regarding the grouting of the remaining 
33 meters of the diversion culvert, there are two options to be considered: 
“Option 1: Drilling 2 HQ holes into the culvert from the embankment crest 
and tremie a sand cement mortar into the culvert to complete the grouting 
as designed. The argument for doing this is to prevent possible collapse of 
the culvert near the upstream face of the embankment.” 
The letter continued to say that the load on the corrugated steel culvert would 
exceed design maximum by 60 percent and that the cost of implementing this option 
would be less than two thousand dollars. 
“Option 2: Complete grouting of existing concrete plug and leave the 
remainder of the culvert as is . . . and accept the risk that the culvert will 
collapse and threaten the integrity of the embankment. This risk is 
considered to be small as a high degree of conservatism is built into the 
design tables.” 
The latter, less conservative option was recommended by the consulting engineer 
and accepted by the Omai Mine.81 
In summary, this evidence indicates that the company knew that the dam was 
being subjected to stresses exceeding its design capacity, that there were flaws in its 
construction that could lead to its failure and that any such failure would have disas­
trous consequences because of the large volumes of liquids that would be released 
and their elevated cyanide concentrations. 
In addition, news and other documents refer to reports that are not in the public 
domain. A report produced in 1988 for The National, a program put on by the 
Canadian Broadcasting Company, cited a U.S. engineer’s report that stated that “We 
are at a loss to explain why the design and construction of . . . critical elements of the 
dam were executed so inadequately.”82 A coalition of NGOs working on the Omai case 
stated that environmental specialists had referred to the Omai Mine as an ongoing 
disaster well before the 1995 dam failure.83 
In contrast, Cambior’s 1995 Annual Report painted a rather different picture. 
According to the statement signed by the CEO and the Chairman of the Board: 
“The Commission’s Dam Review Committee conducted a thorough investi­
gation of the tailings pond dam and determined the cause to be structural 
failure related to the faulty design and site supervision of the filter zone and 
drainage culvert from the initial stage of construction. While Cambior has 
consistently applied North American environmental and operating stan­
dards to its domestic and foreign activities, the Omai tailings dam failure 
reveals that such rare incidents can befall even the most prudent of mining 
companies anywhere, at any time.”84 
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Disclosures 
Cambior disclosed the dam failure and subsequent events in a series of press releases 
and financial reports. For example, the 1995 CAMBIOR Year End Financial Results Press 
Release contains a brief mention of the incident: “. . . 1995 had been a difficult year with 
the Omai incident.” Also, “the reduction of cash flow and the reporting of a loss in 1995 
are attributable to the interruption of operations at the Omai mine . . . .”85 In subsequent 
releases, the company disclosed the results of the various official inquiries, 
Management Discussion & Analysis filings that the build-up the filing and subsequent 
progress of lawsuits against it, the resumption of operations at the mine, and other 
material facts relevant to the aftermath of the event. Cambior met its disclosure obliga­
tions in that regard. However, prior to the event, there was no mention in any of the 
company’s reports of liquid behind the dam accumulating to volumes many times 
greater than its design capacity, combined with known flaws in the design and con­
struction of the dam, constituted a known material risk or uncertainty. Since the com­
pany had known as early as 1992 and 1993 that flaws in the construction of the dam 
posed risks of failure, it is hard to imagine that those risks, combined with the large vol­
umes of liquids with high cyanide concentrations in storage, did not appear through the 
eyes of management to pose material risks to the company and its investors.86 
Boliden – Los Frailes 
The Event 
Overnight between April 24 and 25, 1998, a major portion of a large tailings pond dam 
failed at Spain’s Los Frailes mine, owned by the Canadian mining company Boliden, 
Limited. A slab of soil beneath the dam 20 meters wide slid approximately one meter 
towards Agrio River.The dam cracked and broke abruptly, spilling between five and 
seven million cubic meters of contaminated water and slurries through the gap. The 
spill of highly acidic liquids containing high concentrations of metals and other toxic 
compounds caused a 3.6 meter increase in the water level of the river as far as 7 kilo­
meters below the dam. Three rivers were affected: the Los Frailes, Agrio, and 
Guadiamar, along with approximately 5,000 hectares (11,000 acres) of land, much of 
which was highly productive farmland.87 Damage was also caused in the Doñana 
National Park, a UN World Heritage Site. The Guadiamar River runs directly through 
this park. Boliden has spent at least $12 million on cleanup of the Los Frailes spill.88 
Material Consequences 
The news of the dam failure prompted a 28 percent decrease in the value of Boliden 
Limited’s stock on the Toronto Stock Exchange in the five days after it was reported.89 
The total drop in share value as a result of the disaster is estimated at between $50 and 
$100 million Canadian dollars.90 The event also triggered other material conse­
quences. On October 2, 2000, Boliden announced that its subsidiary Boliden Apirsa 
had filed a court application for bankruptcy. The company would not continue the 
development of the Los Frailes mine after October 2001. The Spanish court accepted 
this petition. 
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A class action lawsuit was filed by the Canadian law firm Klein Lyons on behalf of 
Boliden’s shareholders. The lawsuit alleges negligence on Boliden’s part and claims 
millions of dollars in damages as a result of Boliden’s failure to disclose the risk of the 
dam breach.91 Moreover, on November 16, 2002, Boliden was sued for $89.9 million 
by the Andalucian regional government. Although this case was dismissed on January 
2, 2003, the regional government is now trying to recover the money through admin­
istrative channels. On August 2, 2002, the Spanish Council of Ministers demanded 
that Boliden pay $45 million in penalties for the spill. Boliden refused and this 
demand is still pending. The Spanish Government has spent over $275 million clean­
ing up after the spill. 
The Background 
Aznalcóllar is located in southern Spain, 45 kilometers northwest of Seville. In 1960, 
Andaluza de Piritas, SA (Apirsa) was formed as part of the Banco Central SA indus­
trial group (now Banco Hispano Americano), in order to acquire and exploit pyro­
clast and pyrite deposits. The tailings dam was constructed in 1978 and processing 
began with the production of zinc, lead and copper concentrates in 1979. It was 
designed and built by Geocisa, another company owned by Banco Central. In 1987, 
Apirsa was acquired by the Swedish-Canadian group Boliden, which continued 
extraction from the Aznalcóllar open pit until 1996. The company also located anoth­
er ore body, called Los Frailes, in the same area. Production from this deposit started 
in 1997, with a capacity of 4 million tons per year, using the same processing facilities 
and tailings impoundment as Aznalcóllar. 
The geology of the valley where the tailings pond and dam were constructed con­
sists of a 10-meter layer of alluvial gravel overlying 30 meters of marl.92 The tailings 
dam is two kilometers long and one kilometer wide. The embankments are con­
structed of a bentonite plug extending through the alluvial sediments one and a half 
meters into the clay layer below and are built up with waste rock. At its highest point, 
the embankment is currently 30m above ground level and is raised annually by one 
meter. The impoundment was designed for 70 metric tons of tailings, equivalent to 
32.6 million cubic meters, and had reached almost half its capacity when the dam 
failed. The liquid in the impoundment was highly acidic and contained elevated lev­
els of copper, lead, zinc and iron. 
The principal cause of the Los Frailes accident has been established as deficiencies 
in the design and construction of the tailing dam by Dragados y Construcciones, and 
its associated engineering firms, Itecsa and Geocisa.93 These deficiencies, coupled with 
the fragility of clay soil and the high pressures of the water on the clay foundation94 
are said to have triggered the dam failure. Essentially, with the weight of tailings 
behind it, a segment of the dam slid downhill on its slick clay base. The flow of tail­
ings that escaped through the breach caused a rupture of a 50-meter section of the 
embankment. About two million cubic meters of liquid and three million cubic 
meters of solids were released from the tailings impoundment.95 
Complaints had been made to the Andalucian authorities in late 1995 by Boliden­
Apirsa’s mining engineer, Manuel Aguilar Campos, about seepage from the tailings 
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facility.96 Thereafter, in early 1996, a Spanish environmental group97 filed a complaint 
in the Court of First Instance in Sanlúcar la Mayor alleging that defects in the con­
struction of successive lifts of the dam wall since 1989 could cause a failure of the walls 
and that seepage from the dam was polluting the Agrio and Guadiamar Rivers.98 
Shortly after the complaints were made, Boliden-Apirsa and the Spanish authori­
ties agreed to commission Geotécnica y Cimientos, S.A. (Geocisa), to conduct a study 
of the stability of the dam. This study was reviewed by outside academic experts and 
forwarded for review to the appropriate Spanish central and regional authorities. The 
study included a review and verification of the original 1978 design parameters. It also 
included borehole drilling and trench excavation at the dam and laboratory tests and 
stability calculations under various hypotheses. In March 1996 the study found no 
signs of instability in the dam. 
Early in 1996, Boliden-Apirsa also commissioned Golder Associates to carry out a 
hydro-geological study to determine the actual extent of the seepage. This study con­
cluded that the volume of water seeping through the dam wall and screens were 10 
cubic meters per hour, of which 85 percent were being captured by existing contain­
ment and pumping systems. Boliden-Apirsa also commissioned Dames & Moore to 
investigate and report on possible technical solutions to minimize this seepage. 
After its stability study, Geocisa was commissioned to design the next stage of dam 
wall lifts required to accommodate tailings from the Los Frailes mine and to make 
recommendations for expanded monitoring of the dam. In its June 1996 report, 
Geocisa recommended actions to verify that new construction conformed to design 
specifications. Geocisa also recommended that instruments be installed and moni­
toring conducted to detect possible movements in the aquifer in the alluvium terrace 
and the dam. These recommendations were all accepted by Boliden-Apirsa and sub­
sequently implemented by Geocisa under a separate contract. 
On 20 June 1996, the regional government issued an order permitting Boliden-
Apirsa to proceed with the next stage of dam wall lifts in accordance with Geocisa’s 
design. The authority was satisfied that the steps taken by Boliden-Apirsa “confirm 
the stability of the tailings dam challenged in the complaint.” The order also stated 
that the agency had recommended retaining the current features of the construction 
and monitoring the behavior of the dam wall.99 
This order terminated the complaint process initiated by Boliden-Apirsa’s ex-min­
ing engineer Manuel Aguilar Campos and on 4 March 1997 a Court dismissed the 
complaint lodged by the Spanish environmental group, as the facts alleged were 
found not to constitute any offense.100 
As the dam wall was lifted, a hydraulic barrier was constructed around it, 20-30 
meters downhill, to eliminate seepage, and the capacity of the existing water 
treatment plant was also increased by 50 percent. In early 1997, Boliden-Apirsa and 
Geocisa completed the installation of the recommended monitoring system. In 
accordance with the recommendations of Geocisa, piezometers were installed in the 
alluvium terrace and did not penetrate into the marl formation. By March 1997, 
Geocisa had begun the recommended inspection and reporting program. Geocisa 
delivered the first of these summary reports (for 1997) to Boliden-Apirsa in March 
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1998, one month before the dam failure. The most recent inspection prior to the 
failure was on 14 April 1998. None of the inspections and monitoring activities carried 
out before the failure indicated any instability in the dam.101 
After the event, criminal charges were filed in 1998 against 22 individuals associated 
with the company, its contractors, and other organizations, alleging that they had 
brought about the accident. On 27 December 2000, the court exonerated the 
defendants in the case,102 stating that there was no indication of criminal liability with 
regard to the failure of the dam and the toxic spillage.103 An expert report prepared on 
behalf of the Court of Sanlúcar la Mayor had stated that the dam failure was due to 
the fact that during its construction and enlargement the builders did not take into 
account two factors crucial for its stability. The first was the susceptibility of clay soil 
under the dam to the risk of triggering a dam failure. The second was the high 
pressure of the water in the clay foundation.104 Boliden-Apirsa repeatedly stated that 
the accident was to be attributed to force majeure. A report on the causes of the dam 
failure, published on 29 December 1999 by the regional government of Andalucia,105 
supported the company’s position, finding that the accident was caused by a failure 
of the marl formation beneath the impoundment. 
However, between 1992 and 1997 several complaints had been made to SEPRONA 
(the Environmental Criminal Investigative Police Unit) and to the various courts in 
the area regarding both the high levels of toxic chemical that were allegedly seeping 
out of the Aznalcóllar Mine into the Agrio River and the possibility that the dam was 
unstable. Moreover, the report prepared by Geocisa on behalf of Boliden in June 1996 
stated that sliding surfaces were forming in the marl underneath the foundation. 
Other technical experts in Spain have also pointed to flaws in the dam’s construc­
tion. Rafael Baena Escudero of the Department of Physical Geography and Regional 
Geographic Analysis stated: 
“In this case, a complete lack of foresight emerged. The dam was built on top 
of expansive clays. Within these clays, deformations have occurred, which 
were propagated to the soil, readjusting the blocks whenever a movement 
occurred. In this sense, the seepage through the marls has the effect that these 
layers, the phylosilicates, swell and expand their volume. The opposite hap­
pens when they dry out and force the shrinking of the clay. This movement 
of expansion/contraction is constant and should have been accounted for. 
Especially, after the inclinometers had become deformed: something was 
moving. This is a matter of general negligence and not a problem of nature.” 
(El Mundo, May 25, 1998) 
In addition, according to a report by Geocisa, deformations of the inclinometers 
had already been observed in 1997, indicating movement in the dam. 
Faced with claims from Spanish authorities for recovery of damages and restora­
tion costs, Boliden admitted in a press release dated Feb. 26, 1999, that the tailings 
dam was ill designed and blamed its contractor Dragados y Construcciones and its 
associated engineering firms, Itecsa and Geocisa, for the failure. Their “incorrect 
interpretation of the geotechnical properties of the Margas Azules (Blue Clay) 
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Formation [. . .] facilitated the failure of the tailings dam.”106 In October 2002, 
Boliden’s Spanish subsidiary Boliden Apirsa sued Dragados y Construcciones S.A., 
for a minimum of 107 million Euros. 
Continuing the litigation, a class action lawsuit was filed in Canada by Klein Lyons 
that cites a myriad of warnings from the Spanish government, scientists, and 
Boliden’s own engineers of the deficiencies in the dam prior to its failure. Lawyers at 
Klein Lyons have obtained internal documents that they claim will be crucial in prov­
ing these allegations. However, they are confidential and will not be available to the 
public until they are entered in court proceedings.107 
Disclosures 
Nothing in Boliden’s annual reports or interim financial statements prior to the dam 
failure mentions any possibility of structural problems in the Los Frailes tailings dam. 
The company’s Management Discussion & Analysis prior to the event did not treat 
the risk of a dam failure as a material uncertainty known to management. 
Following the event, which the company disclosed in a press release, Boliden’s 
Annual Information Form for 1998, released on April 6, 1999, contained a lengthy 
discussion of the failure, the company’s potential liability, and the possible legal 
108consequences:
“On April 25, 1998, the Aznalcollar tailings dam failed. Approximately 1.3 mil­
lion cubic metres of tailings and 5.5 million cubic metres of tailings water 
were discharged into the nearby Rio Agrio, a seasonal watercourse in the 
semi-arid Andalucian region. The discharged materials flowed in a south­
easterly direction following the course of the riverbed approximately two 
kilometres into the Rio Guadiamar and from there further downstream. 
Approximately 2,600 hectares of land along the Rio Agrio and the Rio 
Guadiamar were covered with tailings. There was limited property damage 
but no personal injuries. Immediately after the failure, all mining and milling 
activities at Los Frailes were halted. Within three days of the failure, Apirsa 
developed a plan for cleaning up the discharged tailings . . ..” 
“In November 1998, Apirsa filed a final closure and remediation plan for the 
tailings facility with the Spanish governmental authorities and applied for 
the licences and permits required to implement the plan. Apirsa has not yet 
received approval of the plan. Apirsa has, however, completed almost all the 
work required by the Spanish governmental authorities to strengthen the 
tailings dam. The balance of the work will be completed as soon as the judge 
investigating the cause of the tailings dam failure authorizes Apirsa to do so. 
See “Investigations into the Cause of the Failure’’ below . . .” 
Investigations into the Cause of the Failure 
“. . . Immediately after the failure, each of Apirsa and the Spanish govern­
mental authorities engaged independent consultants to investigate the cause 
of the failure. Subsequently, the investigating judge also engaged independ­
106 Boliden news release, 
February 26, 1999. 
107 Personal communication 
from Douglas Lennox, Klein 
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ent consultants to investigate the cause of the failure. Apirsa engaged Eptisa, 
Servicios de Ingenier´_a S.A. (“Eptisa”) as its consultant. Apirsa also engaged 
an international panel of independent engineering experts from Canada, 
Spain and Sweden to review Eptisa’s work and to assist it in preparing its 
report. 
“To date, Eptisa is the only independent consultant to have delivered its 
report. In its report, Eptisa concluded that the tailings dam failed as a result 
of a 60 metre lateral displacement of a 700 metre long section of the eastern 
portion of the tailings dam. The tailings dam, together with the four metre 
thick alluvium terrace upon which it lies and the upper 10 metres of the blue 
marl (clay) formation below the alluvium terrace, formed a block which slid, 
with almost no deformation of the tailings dam, along a near horizontal 
bedding plane in the marl formation. The failure was initiated by 
overstressing and progressive failure on the bedding plane and was 
influenced mainly by excess pore pressures induced in the marl formation by 
the tailings dam construction process. The failure mechanism developed 
during an undetermined period, from an initial stage of slow and progressive 
weakening along the bedding plane, eventually reaching instability.” 
Position of Apirsa 
“In the opinion of Apirsa, neither the work carried out by the independent 
consultants involved in the original design, siting and construction of the 
tailings dam (which was completed in 1978, nine years before Boliden 
acquired Apirsa) nor the work carried out by the independent consultant 
engaged by Apirsa in 1996 in connection with the project to increase the 
height of the tailings dam to accommodate tailings from the new Los Frailes 
mine (which included an assessment of the stability of the tailings dam fol­
lowing severe flooding in the area) and thereafter to monitor the stability of 
the tailings dam gave any indication of the possible failure of the tailings 
dam.” 
“In February 1999, Apirsa received the report of its geotechnical consultant, 
Principa-EQE, which identified three significant deficiencies with respect to 
the work carried out by third parties in connection with the original design, 
siting and construction of the tailings dam and the project to increase the 
height of the tailings dam in 1996. The first deficiency relates to the overesti­
mation by the designers of the rate at which the weight of the dam and the 
pond would contribute to the stability of the structure and the rate at which 
the dam could be safely enlarged. This overestimation resulted from the use 
of inaccurate assumptions with respect to the rate at which water in the soils 
underlying the tailings dam would dissipate over time. The second deficien­
cy relates to the use of inaccurate design values with respect to the frictional 
resistance of the blue marl (clay) formation to shear or sliding failure that 
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did not take into account all of the available laboratory test data. The third 
deficiency relates to the use of safety ratios and material strength properties 
that did not sufficiently reflect the degree of conservatism necessary when 
dealing with a material such as marl which is brittle and over-consolidated. 
The report concludes that, if the deficiencies had not occurred, a more con­
servative design would have resulted and, in the words of the report, ‘’if that 
additional conservatism had been implemented, the failure of the tailings 
dam at Aznalcollar need not have occurred.’” (Emphasis added.) 
Possible Liability 
“Notwithstanding the position of Apirsa, it is possible that officers of Apirsa 
will have criminal charges laid against them in connection with the tailings 
dam failure and be convicted and fined and that they will be held liable, in 
whole or in part, for the damages suffered by third parties as a result of the 
failure, including the costs incurred by the Spanish governmental authorities 
in cleaning up the southern sector below the tailings dam. It is also possible 
that Apirsa will have administrative charges laid against it in connection with 
the failure and be convicted and fined, either on the basis of strict liability or 
because a court concludes that Apirsa was negligent in some way or is vicar­
iously responsible for any liabilities of its officers.” 
“Apirsa believes that the investigation currently underway will eventually 
determine and allocate liability for all the damages caused by the failure, 
including the damages suffered by Apirsa. Apirsa intends to vigorously pur­
sue any claims for damages that it may have against those third parties that 
it believes are responsible for the failure.” 
“There is a risk that one or more third parties who suffered damages as a 
result of the failure could commence an action against the Corporation and 
one or more of its subsidiaries as direct or indirect shareholders of Apirsa 
alleging that they are not entitled to the limited liability protection provided 
to shareholders under Spanish corporate law based on the theory of ‘pierc­
ing the corporate veil’ or similar legal theory. There is also a risk that such 
third parties could be successful in such an action and that the Corporation 
and one or more of its subsidiaries could be held responsible for any liabili­
ties of Apirsa. The Corporation has obtained an opinion from Spanish legal 
counsel that, although the matter is not free from doubt, in any final decision 
of the Supreme Court of Spain, the Corporation and one or more of its sub­
sidiaries as direct or indirect shareholders of Apirsa should not be held 
responsible for any liabilities of Apirsa, based on the legal theory of ‘piercing 
the corporate veil’ or any similar legal theory. The opinion relies, in part, on 
a certificate of an officer of Apirsa as to certain factual matters with respect 
to Apirsa, including its share capital, management structure, ongoing opera­
tions, assets and number of employees.” 
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Subsequent filings reported on further consequences of the event as they devel­
oped. In summary, Boliden was aware for years prior to the accident of allegations 
that there were risks that the dam might fail because it was warned by its own engi­
neering employee and by its engineering consultant. It was aware that liquids were 
seeping through the dam and responded with studies, tests, monitoring, and inspec­
tions. Its own monitoring equipment detected movement within the dam well before 
it failed. Although it initially claimed that the dam failed through force majeure, it  
eventually conceded that the design and construction were at fault. Prior to the dam’s 
failure, however, the company never disclosed to investors that this was a material risk 
and a known uncertainty. 
Royal Oak Mining – The Giant Mine 
The Event 
Royal Oak Mining, Limited, declared bankruptcy in April 1999, citing low gold prices, 
leaving behind substantial unfunded and undisclosed environmental liabilities at its 
mining properties. Notable among them was the Giant Mine in Yellowknife, Canada 
where 240,000 tons of highly toxic arsenic trioxide remained buried in underground 
mining vaults, leaching arsenic into ground and surface waters. Prior to bankruptcy, 
Royal Oak’s third quarter 1998 report listed assets totaling $840.3 million and liabilities 
totaling $645.8 million, exclusive of the costs of dealing with the arsenic trioxide.109 That 
problem was left to the government of Canada and the taxpayers. Recent engineering 
estimates of the costs of closure and remediation are approximately $200 million. 
Background 
The Giant Mine went into production in 1948 using a roasting operation to extract 
gold from its arsenopyrite ore, producing arsenic trioxide dust as a waste product. 
The arsenic trioxide dust that was collected was blown underground into mined out 
and some specially constructed chambers for storage 20 to 75 meters below the sur­
face. After 50 years of mining operations, approximately 240,000 tons of arsenic tri­
oxide dust had accumulated underground and about 10-13 tons were added every day 
over the last few decades. When underground storage began in 1951, it was considered 
the best option at the time, based on the occurrence of permafrost and low perme­
ability in the bedrock. The storage chambers were located in the zone that had been 
dried out by mining activities that lowered the water table but water was flowing in 
the chamber areas. This flow was captured by the mine’s collection system and treat­
ed prior to discharge to the environment. 
However, open pit mining and extensive underground workings around the cham­
bers compromised the permafrost. This, together with the permeability of the host 
rock and a re-assessment of the rate of mine re-flood has called underground storage 
into question as a permanent solution. Arsenic trioxide is soluble in water and there 
is evidence of groundwater movement through the rock. Elevated levels of arsenic are 
present in the mine water pumped from the underground workings, indicating that 
groundwater seepage from the storage chambers is already taking place. The vaults 
yale school of forestry & environmental studies 
robert repetto 67 
where the arsenic is stored underground are a few hundred meters from Great Slave 
Lake and threaten the entire Mackenzie River watershed. 
The Giant Mine has had several owners over the years. Royal Oak Mines acquired 
ownership in 1990 and operated the mine from then until April 1999, when it went 
into bankruptcy. The mine is located on land owned by the government of the 
Northwest Territories. It was held by Royal Oak Mines, Ltd. under a surface lease 
without any security for clean up and reclamation other than a requirement to return 
the land in a manner acceptable to the territorial government. The surface clean-up 
costs have been estimated at over $8 million. 
The Giant Mine was operated pursuant to subsurface mineral leases issued by the 
Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (DIAND). A required fed­
eral water license set out conditions related to water use and waste management and 
imposed a security bond of $400,000 for abandonment and reclamation. The license 
also called for studies and actions leading to a management plan for the arsenic tri­
oxide stored underground. The same requirements were in the previous license and 
were not fulfilled by Royal Oak. It is remarkable that the government authorities 
allowed Royal Oak to operate the mine for nine years without an approved plan to 
deal with 240,000 tons of arsenic or a bond to ensure implementation. 
At low gold prices, Giant Mine became a break-even operation that required a 
large infusion of capital to bring it up to modern-day standards for worker safety, effi­
ciency, and pollution control. Royal Oak Mines went into receivership in April 1999 
with no provisions to deal with the arsenic trioxide at the Giant Mine. The arsenic 
problem was left to the federal government. The DIAND Minister initially indicated 
that the federal government would not accept responsibility for the clean up required 
at Giant. However, in late 1999, the receivers, the federal government and Miramar 
Mining Corporation (the owner of the other gold mine in Yellowknife) negotiated an 
agreement that saw the federal government take over the property. The assets were 
then sold to Miramar with the federal government retaining all of the pre-existing 
environmental liability. The underground mining operation at Giant resumed in 
March 2000 with the ore trucked to the nearby Miramar mill. As long as the proper­
ty is profitable and remains in production, Miramar will provide a relatively small 
contribution to a fund that will assist with environmental remediation.110 
DIAND undertook at least 25 studies to find a solution to the problem of the 
underground arsenic, starting in 1997, spending more than $750,000 as a result of 
Royal Oak’s inaction. Few, if any, satisfactory options have been found.111 Several pre­
liminary options were explored, ranging in cost from $70 million to over $1.7 billion. 
Most of the permanent remediation options are of dubious feasibility. Encapsulation 
in cement would require excessive amounts of cement and would not work at the 
high concentrations of arsenic in the waste. Extraction would be difficult to accom­
plish without endangering workers’ health, since arsenic trioxide can be lethal if 
inhaled or absorbed through the skin, and extraction would leave open the question 
of suitable long-term surface storage. Refining the extracted waste into a commercial 
product of 99.5 percent purity would be expensive and the market (almost entirely for 
wood preservatives) has virtually disappeared. 
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Leaving the arsenic trioxide in place underground is now considered is the best 
short-term option. This requires the mine water to be pumped to the surface and 
treated in an effluent treatment plant until the preferred long-term management 
strategy can be determined. Just running the pumps, along with other efforts to 
reduce the flow of water through the mine, costs the federal government $3.6 million 
a year. 
In the long term, the main issues associated with underground disposal are perpet­
ual pumping and treatment and preventing the chambers from flooding. At present, 
after ten years of engineering studies, DIAND is supporting a plan to freeze the arsenic 
underground and let the arctic permafrost hold it in place. It will be the first time it 
has ever been tried and, if successful, it will be one of the longest and most expensive 
environmental cleanups ever undertaken in Canada, all at public expense. The plan 
involves sinking pylons to the level of the lowest arsenic chamber and using active 
refrigeration to restore the permafrost destroyed by decades of mining. The siphons, 
which require no outside power to operate, would then keep the ground frozen. Water 
would slowly be flooded back into the mine, freezing and immobilizing the entire area. 
The entire process would take 20 years and cost the taxpayer somewhere between $90 
million and $120 million.112 Even under this scenario, the pumps would have to keep 
running until the arsenic has leached out of backfilled chambers and vaults, which 
adds an additional $100 million in discounted present costs to the bill. 
Disclosures 
Royal Oak never recognized a liability for reclamation of the stored arsenic trioxide 
nor did it discuss the problem in its financial reports. It did provide for reclamation 
of the surface area under the terms of its lease. According to language in its 1997 and 
1998 annual financial filing: 
“Where estimated reclamation and closure costs are reasonably 
determinable, the Company has recorded a provision for environmental 
liabilities based on management’s estimate of these costs. Such estimates are 
subject to adjustment based on changes in laws and regulations and as 
additional information becomes available.” 
“The Company is not able to determine the impact of future changes in 
environmental laws and regulations, which are generally becoming more 
restrictive, on its operations and future financial position due to the 
uncertainty surrounding the ultimate form such changes may take. 
Insurance against certain liabilities for environmental pollution or other 
hazards as a result of exploration and production has not generally been 
available at reasonable cost to the Company. Absent such insurance, the 
Company’s assets are directly exposed to unknown and unforeseen, but 
potential, liabilities for environmental claims and regulations. The 
satisfaction of any such liabilities could reduce resources otherwise available 
for other business purposes. Nevertheless, the Company believes that it has 
made adequate financial provisions for the costs associated with mine 
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closures and reclamation, and is of the opinion that any changes to 
environmental laws and regulations in the future should not have a material 
effect on the Company.” (Emphasis added.) 
“RECLAMATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL REMEDIATION: . . . In  
Ontario, the Northwest Territories and British Columbia the Company is 
required to post security against all or part of the estimated costs of such 
reclamation. The Company has completed and filed reclamation plans for all 
of its active operations. Reclamation plans have also been prepared for most 
of the Company’s inactive mine sites, and reclamation is well advanced at 
many of these sites. Although the ultimate amount of the obligation to be 
incurred is uncertain, the Company has currently estimated these future 
costs to be $41.2 million. The Company has accrued $24.7 million of recla­
mation and closure costs through December 1997 and will charge the 
remaining amount to operations, over the remaining lives of its operations, 
on a unit-of-production basis. At December 31, 1997, the Company had recla­
mation deposits of $14.3 million of cash and cash equivalents restricted for 
reclamation purposes. The Company believes that the current salvage value 
of its assets at its various mine sites will be sufficient to fund the majority of 
these reclamation costs.” 
Of that $41 million, $9.4 million was on account of the Giant Mine, presumably for 
surface reclamation. However, Royal Oak did refer to the arsenic trioxide problem at 
the Giant Mine in its Water License Annual Report for 1998: 
Revisions to Contingency Plan and Abandonment & Restoration Plan 
“The Contingency Plan was thoroughly revised and submitted to the Water 
Board in August 1998. The plan was approved by the Water Board in October, 
with a request for the inclusion of some additional specific information. Due 
to limited resources, this additional information has not yet been appended 
to the plan.” 
The Abandonment & Restoration Plan for the site was thoroughly revised by 
EBA Engineering Consultants Ltd. and Royal Oak Mines, and submitted to 
the Water Board on December 2, 1998. A one-month extension to the origi­
nal submission date was granted by the Water Board. The document includ­
ed a revision to the estimated reclamation liability, calculated using the 
Reclaim Version 3.1 software. The specific financial liability of the arsenic tri­
oxide concentrate stored underground was excluded from this cost estimate, 
since the research being conducted on removal, processing and chemical sta­
bilization methods for the material has not yet yielded firm conclusions on 
the technical viability of the methods being considered.” (Emphasis added.) 
In summary, despite the fact that Canadian government authorities allowed Royal 
Oak to operate the Giant Mine for nine years without an approved plan to deal with 
the arsenic trioxide problem or a security bond to ensure that the plan would be 
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carried out, it is difficult to conceive that, seen through the eyes of Royal Oak’s 
management, the 240,000 tons of lethal arsenic trioxide in the mine’s vaults did not 
represent a known uncertainty with potentially material financial consequences. 
However, in its public disclosures, investors would find no reference or estimate of the 
very large financial liability that the stored arsenic trioxide represented, a liability that 
subsequently has been estimated in the $200 million range. Were these estimates 
disclosed, the true state of Royal Oak’s balance sheet would have been clear well 
before its declaration of bankruptcy in April 1999. 
Dakota Mining Company – Gilt Edge Mine 
The Event 
In July 1999 the Dakota Mining Company filed for bankruptcy under Canadian law. 
At that time, its Gilt Edge gold mine in South Dakota faced a serious problem with 
acid mine drainage and had 130 million gallons of acid mine wastewater stored in pits 
on the site. The state’s estimate of reclamation costs then exceeded $13 million, against 
which it held a cash bond from the company of $6.2 million and a demand note for 
the balance. 
After the company abandoned the site, the state government proposed it as a 
Superfund site on the National Priorities list. It was included in 2000. The federal gov­
ernment estimated that it would cost between $23 and $27 million to reclaim the site. 
To date, the state of South Dakota has already spent approximately $27 million on 
reclamation. An estimated $18 million more will be needed in order to finish the job.113 
Background 
The Gilt Edge Mine site near Deadwood, South Dakota, was mined by several com­
panies starting in the late 1800s. Most of these were small underground gold mines. 
Mining continued sporadically up until 1941, generating piles of acidic tailings that 
continually discharged acidic and metals-laden water into the nearby creek. 
Gilt Edge, Inc., a subsidiary of Brohm Resources, Inc., was granted a state large-
scale mining permit in 1986 for the Gilt Edge Mine, a gold heap leach project. On 
January 15, 1987, Gilt Edge, Inc. underwent a corporate name change to Brohm 
Mining Corporation. In 1993, in another reorganization, the company changed its 
name to Dakota Mining Corporation, which was incorporated in Canada and had its 
business offices in Denver, Colorado. Brohm became a wholly owned subsidiary 
incorporated in South Dakota. Brohm began construction of the Gilt Edge Mine in 
1987 and completed mining the original reserves in 1992. Despite existing evidence of 
acidity and the presence of sulfide rocks, the original cash bond for reclamation was 
based on mining non-acid generating rock and totaled $1.2 million. During opera­
tions, waste rock containing enough sulfide minerals to generate acid was mined. 
Acid drainage from the waste dump was detected in 1993. 
On April 19, 1993, in response to the acid problem, the South Dakota Department 
of Environment and Natural Resources issued Brohm a Notice of Violation and 
Order that required Brohm to develop a mitigation plan. On March 16, 1995, the 
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Board of Minerals and Environment approved the plan. The acid drainage problem 
raised the 1995 estimated cost of reclamation and reclamation bond to $8.4 million, 
seven times the original bond of $1.2 million. Due to its financial difficulties, Brohm 
was only able to provide an additional $1.0 million cash bond. To cover the rest of the 
increase, the Board of Minerals and Environment approved a $6.2 million Demand 
Note based on the net worth of Dakota Mining Corporation. 
In 1996 the Board of Minerals and Environment approved Brohm’s new large scale 
mine permit application for the Anchor Hill Project, which is adjacent to, but sepa­
rate from, the Gilt Edge Mine. The Anchor Hill Project was projected to provide cash 
flow for Brohm to complete reclamation of the Gilt Edge site. 
The Anchor Hill Project was divided into two phases: Phase I on privately held 
land and Phase II on a site that encroached on U.S. Forest Service land. The state per­
mit for both phases was approved on January 16, 1996. Because the second phase 
encroached on 37 acres of U.S. Forest Service land, it was subject to the federal 
National Environmental Policy Act process. The required Environmental Impact 
Statement was finally approved by the Forest Service in the fall of 1997 but was 
appealed by several environmental groups. The Forest Service withdrew its approval 
of the EIS on February 18, 1998. 
Brohm stopped mining Phase I of Anchor Hill in August 1997 and stopped con­
tributing to the reclamation cash bond. Gold production from ore on the leach pads 
ceased in January 1998. Thereafter, the company laid off 79 employees, leaving 13 to 
manage the water treatment plant and other facilities. On May 21, 1998, Brohm noti­
fied DENR that it no longer had funding to maintain the mine site and that it planned 
to abandon the site. Because Brohm did not have the money to operate the water 
treatment plant, they had filled all available storage places with acid water. 
By 1999 revenues from Phase I of the Anchor Hill Project had funded increases in 
the cash bond for the Gilt Edge site from $2.2 million to just over $6.2 million. 
However, the estimated reclamation costs had increased to more than $13 million. 
On May 29, 1998, Governor Janklow filed suit against Brohm and Dakota. A tem­
porary restraining order and preliminary injunction were obtained that compelled 
Brohm to continue maintaining the site and to comply with its permits. A creditor 
agreed to fund the site in hopes the EIS would be finalized allowing Phase II mining 
to proceed. During the summer of 1998, the Forest Service also issued its second 
approval of the Anchor Hill EIS, but environmental groups again filed an appeal. 
Brohm’s creditors stopped funding in 1999. The additional pressure from creditors, 
along with permitting delays, legal battles and low gold prices, led Dakota in June of 
1999 to announce its intention to declare bankruptcy, and in July 1999 Dakota Mining 
filed for bankruptcy under Canadian law, leaving behind its un-funded reclamation 
obligations. 
Disclosure 
During the period from 1996 through its bankruptcy filing, Dakota Mining consis­
tently underestimated its reclamation liabilities at the Gilt Edge Mine, even relative to 
the surety required by the state of South Dakota, which itself was considerably less 
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than the reclamation cost as later established. For example, in the first half of 1997, the 
South Dakota’s total security requirement was $10.3 to $10.9 million for the Gilt Edge 
Mine. By comparison, the company’s 10-K issued during this period stated: 
“In April 1993, the DENR issued the Order regarding remediation efforts 
related to acid rock drainage at Gilt Edge Mine. The DENR Order remains in 
effect and Dakota is in full compliance. The DENR Order principally 
requires that, unless discharge water meets certain permitted terms and con­
ditions, there shall be no discharge of acid mine drainage. On January 19, 
1996, Dakota received final approval of an updated and amended reclama­
tion plan from the State of South Dakota. Under the conditions of the 
revised reclamation plan, Dakota plans to reclaim waste depositories and 
other areas by capping these areas with impervious materials available from 
the overburden associated with the Anchor Hill oxide deposit. Such capping 
will prevent any continued migration of acid mine drainage.” 
“Dakota has provided the State of South Dakota with a form of financial 
assurance in the amount of $7.9 million in connection with the reclamation 
and remediation plan in the form of cash deposits of $2.4 million and a 
demand note as proof of financial assurance in the amount of $5.5 million. 
Dakota has estimated that its actual capping costs will approximate $3.2 mil­
lion, which costs have been fully accrued at December 31, 1996. Funding of 
this obligation will be made from operating cash flow derived from process­
ing the Anchor Hill oxide deposit.” 
“At a future date when Dakota provides notice to the State of South Dakota 
that the Gilt Edge Mine will close and that post closure care is to begin, 
Dakota will be obligated to convert a portion of its financial assurance into a 
post-closure fund in a form acceptable to the State to ensure long term treat­
ment and maintenance of the site. The amount of the post-closure financial 
assurance is not expected to be less than $3.0 million although no final deter­
mination will be made until the mine actually close.”114 
Reclamation Costs 
“The ultimate amount of the reclamation obligations to be incurred is 
uncertain, however the Company estimates these costs to be $6.9 million at 
Gilt Edge Mine, $721,000 at Stibnite Mine and $900,000 for the Company’s 
40% share at Golden Reward. Of the total $8.4 million in estimated costs, 
$6.0 million has been accrued for as of December 31, 1996. The remaining 
costs will be accrued as mining continues at Gilt Edge Mine and Stibnite 
Mine. However, no assurances can be given that the above estimates accu­
rately reflect the actual costs of all reclamation activities that may be 
required.” 
This information was repeated in quarterly 10-Q filings for the second and third 
quarters of 1997. By mid-1998, when the company was disclosing its capital and work­
ing capital shortfalls, it disclosed the state government’s successful suit to force it to 
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maintain the Gilt Edge site. However, by that time, the estimated cost of reclamation 
had risen to $12.6 million, more than twice the amount in the company’s cash bond. 
This increased liability was not disclosed.115 115 South Dakota Surety 
Tracking Database, Brohm 
“On May 29, 1998, the State of South Dakota obtained a Temporary Mining Corporation, Table 1A, 
Restraining Order (“TRO”) against a subsidiary of Dakota, Brohm Mining updated June 30, 1999. 
Corp. (“Brohm”). The TRO requires Brohm to continue to operate water 
treatment systems at the Gilt Edge mine in accordance with state mine per­
mits. Pending a court hearing scheduled for June 5, 1998, the Company 
intends to comply with this order. The Gilt Edge mine is not in operation at 
”116 116this time. Dakota Mining Corporation, 
8-K, June 8, 1998. 
In summary, in the period when the company’s balance sheet and income state­
ment were deteriorating, the company understated its reclamation liability at Gilt 
Edge by a material amount. According to government officials familiar with this case, 
although it was faced with the problem for years at Gilt Edge, Dakota Mining down­
played its potential liabilities from acid mine drainage in order to avoid scaring off 
117potential investors.117 Personal communication 
from Mike Cepak, SD 
Department of Environment Newmont Mining – Midnite Mine and Natural Resources, 02­
The Event 06-04. 
The Midnite Mine was an open-pit uranium mine on the Spokane Indian reservation 
in Washington State. The site contains pits filled with hundreds of millions of gallons 
of contaminated waters, waste rock, and tailings. The mine was owned and operated 
by Dawn Mining Company, of which Newmont Mining is majority owner. In April 
1998, the EPA began an Expanded Site Inspection (ESI) that confirmed the elevated 
level of contamination; also at this time, Newmont, in agreement with the Bureau of 
Land Management, conducted limited data collection. In February 1999 the EPA pro­
posed that Midnite be added to the National Priority List as a Superfund site and a 
Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study (RI/FS) began. Data collections continued 
from the fall 1999 to spring 2000. On May 11, 2000, EPA listed the Midnite Mine site 
on its NPL. 
Background 
Newmont Mining Corporation owns 51 percent of the Dawn Mining Company 
(DMC), which operated the Midnite Mine, an open-pit uranium mine near 
Wellpinit, Washington from 1955 – 1981. During mine operations, about three million 
tons of 0.2 percent uranium oxide ore, 2.5 million tons of low-grade ore (protore), 
and approximately 33 million tons of waste rock were dug up from six pits. Some of 
the most radioactive ore was uncovered just prior to the mine closure and is still 
exposed. When this ore, which contains sulfides and pyrites, is exposed to oxygen and 
water, it forms sulfuric acid. As the acid percolates through the ore, it leaches urani­
um and other heavy metals into the open pits and into the groundwater. During the 
1980s, approximately 500 million gallons of acidic water filled the open pits, threat­
ening to overtop the pits and flush acidic wastes into nearby Blue Creek. 
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After excavations ceased in 1981, two of the six pits were left open and have col­
lected seep water. The other four were backfilled with waste rock from the mine. 
Protore and waste rock piles lie throughout the 320 acres disturbed by mining. In the 
decade following closure (i.e., from 1981-1991) the former U.S. Bureau of Mines and 
the U.S.Geological Survey conducted site inspections that documented heavy metals 
and radionuclides in the seeps, groundwater, and pit water at the mine. 
After 1981, Dawn Mining Company (DMC) operated an onsite mill to extract ura­
nium from sludge and other remaining ores. Waste from this process was dumped 
into a lined tailings disposal pond. In 1991, the lease to DMC was terminated and a 
formal mine reclamation plan was required. Since 1992, Dawn has been collecting and 
treating surface water to control contaminated mine drainage. Water is treated on-site 
and discharged, under an NPDES permit, into a surface drainage. DMC’s reclamation 
plan, submitted in 1994, proposed accepting radioactive wastes from other states for 
processing and disposal at the mill. It met with community challenges and was not 
accepted by the state. Although a revised plan has been tied up in legal contests, 
nonetheless DMC did obtain licenses for reclamation and closure activities from the 
State of Washington in 1996. DMC was required to post reclamation bonds of $10 
million for the mill site and $9.7 million for the mine site, but only $1.0 - $3.2 million 
is currently in the reclamation fund. In comparison, the cleanup and reclamation cost 
of the mill and mine has been estimated in press reports at $120 to $240 million. 
In April 1998, the EPA began an Expanded Site Inspection (ESI) that confirmed the 
elevated level of contamination. Also at this time, Newmont, in agreement with the 
Bureau of Land Management, conducted some data collection. In February 1999 the 
EPA proposed that Midnite be added to the National Priorities List and a Remedial 
Investigation/Feasibility Study (RI/FS) began. This proposal carried important finan­
cial implications for Newmont, the parent company, because CERCLA’s provisions 
for joint and several liability greatly increased the likelihood that it, as the majority 
owner of Dawn Mining, would be held liable for remediation costs at the Midnite 
Mine and possibly the entire cost. 
Data collection continued from the fall 1999 to spring 2000. On May 11, 2000, EPA 
listed the Midnite Mine site on its National Priorities List. The second phase data col­
lection of the RI/FS began in the fall of 2000 and continued to fall 2001. Data from 
Newmont, primarily related to onsite elements, was incorporated in “scoping the 
work.” EPA was expected to complete the RI/FS study at the end of 2003. In December 
2003 EPA released a report that outlined clean-up alternatives but did not contain 
cost estimates. 
Disclosures 
Newmont has promptly disclosed material events at the Midnite mine as they 
occurred. Going back to the first quarter 10-Q filing in 1994, for example, the compa­
ny disclosed that the state government had not accepted Dawn’s reclamation plan, 
which Dawn was therefore revising. It also stated that 
“Dawn does not have sufficient funds to pay for the reclamation plan it pro­
posed, for any alternative plan, or for the closure of its mill. The corpora­
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tion’s best estimate for the future costs related to these matters is included in 
the accrued liability for environmental matters, as previously discussed. The 
Department of Interior previously notified Dawn that when the lease was 
terminated, it would seek to hold Dawn and the Corporation liable for any 
costs incurred as a result of Dawn’s failure to comply with the lease and 
applicable regulations. If asserted, the Corporation will vigorously contest 
any such claims.”118 
Elsewhere in the filing, it was indicated that $61.6 million had been accrued for 
environmental obligations related to former mining activities, including Midnite. 
This amount fluctuated in later reports. 
Subsequent filings updated this information with varying amounts for accrual. In 
the third quarter of 1994, the company disclosed that it had submitted revised recla­
mation plans and in the first quarter of 1995 it revealed that DMC received a license 
from the state for its mill closure plan, but it was being contested by third parties. In 
the second quarter of 1996, Newmont disclosed that: “The Department of Interior has 
begun an ESI to analyze DMC’s proposed plan and to consider alternatives to the 
company plan.” Nine months later, the 10-Q stated that: “In March 1997, a 
Washington superior court upheld DMC’s license for reclamation activities, but there 
are further legal appeals.” 
As the federal government moved toward inclusion of the Midnite Mine in the 
Superfund remediation program, Newmont noted the various phases in rather non­
specific language: In its first quarter 10-Q in 1998, just before EPA announced its 
Expanded Site Investigation, it disclosed that “Other government agencies also might 
attempt to hold the Company liable for further remediation and reclamation at the 
mine or mill site.” In its third quarter filing, after the EPA action, it stated that: “EPA 
may become more involved in the process.” In its 1998 10-K report, after EPA had pro­
posed the site for the NPL on February 16, 1999, the company disclosed, “In early 1999, 
the EPA proposed that the mine be included in the National Priorities List under CER­
CLA. If asserted, the Company cannot reasonably predict the likelihood or outcome of 
any future action against Dawn or the Company arising from this matter.”119 
Not until the first quarter of 1999 did Newmont specifically mention the ongoing 
ESI study: 
“The Department of Interior has commenced an Environmental Impact 
Study to analyze Dawn’s proposed plan and to consider what type of mine 
reclamation plan may be selected by the Department of Interior. Dawn does 
not have sufficient funds to pay for the reclamation plan it proposed, for any 
alternative plan, or for the closure of its mill. The Department of Interior 
previously notified Dawn that when the lease was terminated, it would seek 
to hold Dawn and the Company liable for any costs incurred as a result of 
Dawn’s failure to comply with the lease and applicable regulations. In early 
1999, the EPA proposed that the mine be included on the National Priorities 
List under CERCLA. If asserted, the Company will vigorously contest any 
such claims. The Company cannot reasonably predict the likelihood or out­
118 Newmont Mining 
Corporation  Quarterly 
Report10-Q, 3/31/94  CFS, 
Note 6, Contingencies, p.  10.  
119 Newmont 10-K Annual 
Report 1998 CFS, Note #18 
Commitments and 
Contingencies, p.32. 
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p. 13. 
come of any future action against Dawn or the Company arising from this 
matter. Dawn has received a license for a mill closure plan that could gener­
ate funds to close and reclaim both the mine and the mill. The license is 
being challenged by third parties.”120 
In its following 10-K annual report for 1999, Newmont discussed the government's 
inclusion of Midnite on the NPL: “Other government agencies have asserted that the 
Company is liable for future reclamation or remediation work at the mine or mill site. 
In mid-2000, the mine was included on the NPL under CERCLA. The Company will 
vigorously contest any claims as to its liability. The Company cannot reasonably pre­
dict the likelihood or outcome of any future action against Dawn or the Company 
arising from this matter.”121 
In the following year’s 10-K, the company mentioned that the RI/FS had begun 
and moderated its position as to liability: “In mid-2000, the mine was included on 
NPL and EPA has initiated a RI/FS under CERCLA to determine environmental 
conditions and remediation options at the site. The EPA has asserted that Dawn and 
the Company are liable . . ..”122 
A year later, the company’s annual report further modifies its potential liability: 
“At a third site in the U.S., an inactive uranium mine and mill formerly 
operated by a subsidiary of Newmont, remediation work at the mill is 
ongoing, but remediation at the mine is subject to dispute and has not 
commenced. The environmental standards that may ultimately be imposed 
at this site as a whole remain uncertain and there is a risk that the costs of 
remediation may exceed the provision Newmont’s subsidiary has made for 
such remediation by a material amount. Whenever a previously 
unrecognized remediation liability becomes known or a previously 
estimated cost is increased, the amount of that liability or additional cost is 
expensed and this can materially reduce net income in that period.”123 
However, in subsequent filings through 2003, the company has maintained that 
since remediation requirements at the Midnite have not been finally decided, it can­
not estimate its potential liability and intends vigorously to contest claims against it. 
Since the EPA had not completed its RI/FS by the end of 2003, even to the extent 
of releasing the estimated costs associated with its retained remediation alternatives, 
and had not issued a Record of Decision, Newmont could plausibly claim that it 
could not estimate its potential liability. However, when the Midnite Mine was put 
under CERCLA’s provisions, the company became subject to specific SEC and FASB 
disclosure requirements, as discussed in a prior section of this report. Those 
requirements prohibited the company from deferring disclosure until a single cost 
estimate had been established and required it to provide a range of possible liabilities 
if such a range could reasonably be estimated. By the end of 2003 Newmont had not 
provided even such a range of potential reclamation costs, although the Midnite 
Mine had been a Superfund site for three years. In late 2003 an asset management 
company filed a shareholder resolution with Newmont calling for fuller disclosure of 
environmental liabilities. 
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conclusions 
The large majority of the case studies in this report reveal a common deficiency in 
disclosure. Recall the requirement in Canadian securities law and regulation that “If 
an environmental risk or uncertainty is necessary for an understanding of the Issuer’s 
financial condition, changes therein, or results of operations, it should be disclosed 
under Part III, MD&A, Item 1(1)(3), para. 108, with particular emphasis on risks in the 
”124next two years.
Recent guidance issued by the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants on 
MD&A disclosures emphasizes companies’ obligations to provide management’s 
assessment of future value drivers and material trends and uncertainties, giving 
investors a realistic portrayal of the business outlook and prospects as seen by 
management. Securities regulations in the United States contain equivalent 
requirements. 
These ten case studies investigated events that were financially material, some to 
the extent that they involved bankruptcy of the company involved. In nearly all of the 
cases, the underlying risks and uncertainties that resulted in the events were known 
to management but were not disclosed or discussed in the companies’ MD&A filings 
sufficiently to provide investors a realistic portrayal of the risks. In most cases they 
were simply not mentioned at all. 
These findings reinforce the calls that have been made in recent years by investor 
groups and public interest groups for improved disclosure of environmental 
information. They add to the evidence available from other studies that disclosure 
practices in many environmentally sensitive industries have been inadequate. They 
support the claims that enforcement efforts by securities regulators in both the 
United States and Canada need to be strengthened in order to secure better 
compliance with relevant disclosure requirements. Finally, they also support recent 
pronouncements by accounting standards bodies and securities regulators calling for 
improvements by listed companies in their Management Discussion & Analysis of 
known material risks and uncertainties stemming from environmental and other 
business exposures. 
124 See above, p. 9. 
yale school of forestry & environmental studies 
78 silence is golden, leaden, and copper 
Robert Repetto is a Senior Advisor to Stratus Environmental Consulting, Inc. in 
Boulder, Colorado, Fellow of the Tim Wirth Chair in the Graduate School of Public 
Affairs at the University of Colorado, and Professor in the Practice of Economics and 
Sustainable Development at the Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies 
(2001-2004). Before moving to Boulder, Dr. Repetto was vice president of the World 
Resources Institute, a non-profit policy research center in Washington, D.C., and 
director of its economics program. From 1998 to 2000 he was a Pew Fellow in Marine 
Conversation at the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute. Earlier in his career, 
Robert Repetto was a professor at the Harvard School of Public Health, a World Bank 
official working in Indonesia, an economic advisor to the planning commission in 
Bangladesh, a Ford Foundation staff economist in India, and an economic analyst at 
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. 
Dr. Repetto is known for his writings and research on the interface between 
environment and economics and on policies to promote sustainable economic 
development. His recent work with Duncan Austin on environment and finance was 
awarded the Moskowitz Prize for 2000. He has served as a member of the National 
Research Council’s Board on Sustainable Development and as a member of the 
Environmental Economics Advisory Committee of EPA’s Science Advisory Board. He 
holds a BA and a Ph.D. in economics from Harvard University and a M.Sc. degree 
from the London School of Economics. 
Robert Repetto 
Stratus Consulting 
200 Brooks Place 
Boulder, CO 80302 
rrepetto@stratusconsulting.com 
yale school of forestry & environmental studies 
  
Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies 
publication series 
To capture exciting environmental projects at Yale of interest to a broad professional audi­
ence, the Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies Publication Series issues select­
ed work by Yale faculty, students and colleagues each year in the form of books, working 
papers and reports. All publications since 1995 are available for order as bound copies, or as 
free downloadable pdfs, at our online bookstore at www.yale.edu/environment/publica­
tions. To contact Jane Coppock, Editor, F&ES Publication Series: jane.coppock@yale.edu 
© Yale University 2004 
Yale School of Forestry 
& Environmental Studies 
publication series 
205 Prospect Street 
New Haven, Connecticut 06511 
USA 
www.yale.edu/environment/publications 
